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Russia’s 2016 disinformation campaign during the U.S. elections represented the first 
large-scale campaign against the United States and was intended to cause American citizens to 
question the fundamental security and resilience of U.S. democracy. A similar campaign during 
the 2016 U.K. Brexit referendum supported the campaign to leave the European Union. This 
paper assesses the policy formation process in the United States and United Kingdom in response 
to 2016 Russian disinformation using a bureaucratic politics framework. Focusing on the role of 
sub-state organizations in policy formation, the paper identifies challenges to establishing an 
effective policy response to foreign disinformation, particularly in the emergence of leadership 
and bargaining, and the impact of centralization of power in the U.K. Discussion of the shift in 
foreign policy context since the end of the Cold War, which provided a greater level of foreign 
policy consensus, as well as specific challenges presented by the cyber deterrence context, 
supplements insights from bureaucratic politics. Despite different governmental structures, both 
countries struggled to achieve collaborative and systematic policy processes; analysis reveals the 
lack of leadership and coordination in the United States and both the lack of compromise and 
effective fulfillment of responsibilities in the United Kingdom. Particular challenges of 
democracies responding to exercises of sharp power by authoritarian governments point to the 
need for a wholistic response from public and private entities and better definition of intelligence 






In May 2016, Russian actors organized both sides of a political protest and counter-
protest in Texas as part of their campaign to exacerbate divisions during the U.S. Presidential 
election. The demonstrations were tied to anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States, with one 
side opposing the “Islamization of Texas” and the counterprotest supporting Muslims.1 
Threatening posts discussing the protests were reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI), and the Houston City Council met to address the protests.2 The Texas protests represented 
just one of a variety of approaches the Russian government used to interfere in the 2016 U.S. 
election. Russia’s other efforts included running networks of social media accounts, some of 
them through the Internet Research Agency (IRA), a Russian company involved in the 
campaign, publishing inflammatory or false stories through Russian state-run media, and hacking 
and leaking information to the media more broadly. Russia’s campaign generally attempted to 
exacerbate existing polarization of the U.S. population and was intended to increase 
partisanship.3 While Russia had previously engaged in disinformation campaigns, its 2016 effort 
represented the first large-scale campaign directed against the United States. In targeting a high-
profile event like the U.S. Presidential election, Russia’s goal was to cause American citizens to 
question the fundamental security and resilience of U.S. democracy.  
Russia conducted a similar influence campaign during the 2016 U.K. Brexit ballot 
referendum to support the campaign to leave the European Union by using biased Russian state 
media coverage and social media disinformation, though likely to a lesser extent than in the 2016 
 
1 Donie O’Sullivan, “Russian Trolls Created Facebook Events Seen by More than 300,000 Users,” CNNMoney, 
January 26, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/26/media/russia-trolls-facebook-events/index.html. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Alina Polyakova, “What the Mueller Report Tells Us about Russian Influence Operations,” Brookings (blog), April 
18, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/04/18/what-the-mueller-report-tells-us-about-




U.S. elections.4 Accounts connected to the IRA posted pro-Brexit messages on Twitter.5 In 
addition, Russian state news sites such as Sputnik and RT (formerly Russia Today) posted a high 
volume of stories during the referendum campaign, which were predominantly pro-Leave.6 The 
U.K. referendum not only provided Russia with an opportunity to influence the United Kingdom, 
but also to sow division and separatism within the European Union.  
I will analyze the policy formation process in the United States and United Kingdom in 
response to Russian interference in their democratic processes in 2016 through the lens of the 
bureaucratic politics model, which conceptualizes governments as organizations comprised of 
multiple actors who are constrained by their roles and engage in bargaining to form policy. 
Historically, bureaucratic politics has been used to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis and predict 
antiballistic missile (ABM) deployment, aiding in examination of the process through which 
states develop foreign policy.7 In the 2016 U.S. and U.K. cases, one might expect that the two 
governments would respond to the disinformation campaigns with policies designed to punish 
Russia and deter similar actions in the future. In fact, both governments engaged in at least some 
degree of policy formation in response to Russian interference, although their policies were 
viewed by some experts as slow or uncoordinated.8 In the United States, a common assumption 
 
4 Naja Bentzen, “Online Disinformation and the EU’s Response,” European Parliament, February 2019, 2. 
5 Bob Corker et al., “Putin’s Asymmetric Assault On Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. 
National Security” (Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Minority, January 10, 2018), 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf. 
6 “Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum” (89up, February 
10, 2018), https://www.89up.org/russia-report.  
7 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 
1995); Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in 
Perspective,” World Politics 33, no. 2 (1981): 234–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010371.1; Interestingly, the SALT 
case involved Morton Halperin, at the time a Deputy Assistant Secretary 
8 Franklin Foer, “Putin Is Well on His Way to Stealing the Next Election,” The Atlantic, June 2020, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/06/putin-american-democracy/610570/; Greg Miller, Ellen 
Nakashima, and Adam Entous, “Obama’s Secret Struggle to Punish Russia for Putin’s Election Assault,” 
Washington Post, June 23, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/world/national-security/obama-
putin-election-hacking; James Stavridis, “The Mueller Report Made It Clear: America’s Response to Russia Has 
Been Far Too Weak,” Time, May 3, 2019, https://time.com/5582867/mueller-report-trump-russia-sanctions/.  
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is that inaction was caused by President Donald Trump’s unwillingness to call the legitimacy of 
his election into question. However, this view is complicated by similar inaction in the United 
Kingdom, suggesting that either the challenges of responding to a fast-evolving digital threat or 
more broadly applicable structural incentives to play down election interference to protect 
democratic legitimacy might be relevant.  
Many media outlets and some policy analysts characterized the U.S. response to Russian 
disinformation as “grossly inadequate,” and President Donald Trump, the most prominent figure 
in the U.S. response, was criticized for having “shown no leadership, as evidenced again by 
Trump picking a fight over ‘collusion’ with the FBI after the indictments issued,” and had his 
response characterized as “petulant tweets.”9 Though these assessments were promoted by 
political pundits, inaction or disorganization are the dominant public narrative around the U.S. 
response to Russian interference.  
Due to the challenges of incomplete data, my goal is not to evaluate whether or not the 
U.S. policy response was effective. Instead, my analysis of the U.S. response through the lens of 
bureaucratic politics theory complicates the conventional wisdom that the U.S. policy process 
was defined and stymied by partisan infighting and President Trump. My analysis relies on 
publicly available information about the government response; as a result, the data available are 
somewhat limited. Although official statements, hearings, and reports offer a window into the 
policy process, some aspects of the policy process and outcomes were likely covert. The 
November 2020 Senate report investigating the U.S. government response to 2016 election 
 
9 Robert D Blackwill and Philip H Gordon, “Containing Russia: How to Respond to Moscow’s Intervention in U.S. 
Democracy and Growing Geopolitical Challenge,” Council on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report, no. 80 
(January 2018): 54; Emily Stewart, “Russian Election Interference Is Far from over. I Asked 9 Experts How to Stop 
It.,” Vox, February 19, 2018, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/2/19/17023240/election-2018-russia-





interference redacts several complete sections in the list of government actions, concealing 
outcomes, as well as several paragraphs of options that were considered.10 This confirms that a 
portion of both the outcomes and process are hidden from the public. Although existence of 
classified data limits the ability to provide a full assessment of the success or failure of the 
response, the process of forming overt government responses can be examined. As a result, my 
analysis focuses on the process by which national government actors responded to 2016 election 
interference, as opposed to the outcome.  
I will apply bureaucratic politics theory to the policy process in the U.S. and U.K. 
contexts, assessing how government actors interacted to form foreign policy. While both the 
United States and United Kingdom are seen as having struggled to respond to Russian 
interference, interestingly the characterization of the weakness of their policymaking processes 
also seems to have differed, with the United States seen as uncoordinated and the United 
Kingdom as inactive, potentially indicating different challenges or factors at play in the 
bureaucratic politics model. Though the visible U.S. and U.K. responses seem surprisingly 
limited, my analysis reveals that the responses were not actually that unprecedented or 
unexpected given the tools available to policymakers in each case and the difficulties of 
responding to disinformation, and in light of the challenges of open societies and social media in 
the digital age. Although bureaucratic politics emphasizes how actors’ roles and standard 
operating procedure shape their policies, it fails in part to account for geopolitical context. In 
addition, bureaucratic politics anticipates that bargaining and a point person will contribute to the 
policy process, yet neither represents a significant factor in my case studies. The U.K. case study, 
 
10 “US Government Response to Russian Activities,” Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 




though smaller due to the more limited nature of both the Russian campaign and the associated 
U.K. response, reveals the limitations of bureaucratic politics applications to systems of 
government other than that of the United States for which it was tailored. The significance of 
bargaining among independent actors seems greater under U.S. separation of powers, while 




In this chapter, I provide an overview of other recent disinformation campaigns and 
election interference by Russia as context for the U.S. and U.K. cases. Then, I review the 
bureaucratic politics literature. Finally, I discuss deterrence literature and why, although it is not 
directly applicable to my analysis, it is more broadly relevant. The second chapter contains 
background information on the U.S. and U.K. case studies, as well as an overview of the U.S. 
and U.K. policy processes, while the final chapter contains my comparison and analysis of the 
two cases. 
 
Russian Foreign Influence 
During the 21st century, disinformation has increasingly become an important, resource-
efficient way for Russia to exert influence both in the near abroad (a term used to refer to former 
Soviet republics) and against rivals including Western Europe and the United States. Russia’s 
use of disinformation represents part of a larger, often coordinated strategy involving 
cyberattacks, biased state-media coverage, economic influence, and inflammation of ethnic 
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Russian populations in the near abroad.11 While not all of these tactics have been used in every 
country, in combination they reflect a broader pattern of Russian use of sharp power. Sharp 
power is neither soft power, the power to attract, or hard power, military might, but rather 
aggressive diplomacy and manipulation typically employed against democracies by authoritarian 
governments.12 Sharp power expands a country’s influence through strategies that include 
election interference, such as disinformation and leaking sensitive documents, as well as 
influence campaigns taken outside of an election. Disinformation is defined as “information that 
is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country.”13 The 
problem has grown substantial enough that both the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) have established organizations dedicated to countering 
disinformation, particularly from Russia.14   
A review of Russia’s disinformation efforts in the former Soviet space provides context 
for the two cases examined in this study because the differences and similarities across Russian 
uses of sharp power in the near abroad and in the United States and United Kingdom help 
illustrate Russian motivations and the relative effectiveness of various tactics in different 
contexts. Past cases point to challenges to deterrence of these attacks, including attribution, the 
role of state media, the determination of appropriate retaliation, and the exploitation of innate 
societal divisions.  
 
11 Stephen Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance 
(RAND Corporation, 2019). 
12 Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power,” January 4, 2018, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power. 
13 Claire Wardle and Hossein Derakhshan, “Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for 
Research and Policy Making” (Council of Europe, September 27, 2017), https://rm.coe.int/information-disorder-
toward-an-interdisciplinary-framework-for-researc/168076277c.  
14 “About Us | StratCom,” NATO Stratcom Centre of Excellence, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/about-us.; “EU vs 
Disinformation,” EUvsDISINFO, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/. 
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Russian intervention in the proposed relocation of an Estonian war memorial in 2007 
represented the first of Russia’s recent forays into the use of sharp power. The Estonian case in 
certain ways appeared to be a test by Russia of what it could accomplish, as the relocation of a 
war memorial was an inflammatory opportunity but not as impactful as an election or military 
invasion.15 Estonia’s large ethnic Russian minority, around 25% of the population, felt the 
relocation of the statue commemorating the liberation of Estonia from the Nazis by the Soviet 
Union marginalized them and protested.16 In addition to riots by ethnic Russians, distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeted a number of Estonian websites, including banking and 
government sites.17  
In general, sharp power, including cyberattacks and election interference, constitutes a 
way for Russia to intervene in other countries with little to no risk of military retaliation. The 
2007 Estonian cyberattacks illustrate the difficulty of clearly attributing cyberattacks to a state 
actor. Challenges tracing the DDoS attacks, as well as ambiguity around whether the attacks 
were carried out independently by hackers or with the help and coordination of the Russian state, 
mean that these attacks have never been traced to Russia with certainty.18 However, a cyberattack 
would be a logical means of Russian intervention in Estonia, whose membership in NATO 
almost certainly precludes Russian military intervention. Cyberattacks offered a forceful 
alternative for Russia to express its displeasure with the monument’s relocation as well as 
demonstrate its influence over the ethnic Russian minority to Estonia. Some cybersecurity 
experts argue that the attack was likely beyond the skill of non-state hackers or groups and 
 
15 Flanagan et al., Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States Through Resilience and Resistance, 5. 
16 Stephen Herzog, “Revisiting the Estonian Cyber Attacks: Digital Threats and Multinational Responses,” Journal 
of Strategic Security 4, no. 2 (June 2011): 49–60, https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.3. 




therefore was perpetrated by a state actor.19 However, the majority position among cybersecurity 
experts is that skilled hacktivists in Russia carried out the attack with the encouragement of 
Russian media and political rhetoric opposed to moving the statue.20 Regardless of whether 
Russian state actors carried out the attacks, the inflammatory rhetoric and stoking of ethnic 
tensions through state media share characteristics, such as aggravating existing divisions and 
ambiguity about the perpetrator, with Russian efforts to increase partisanship during the 2016 
U.S. election.  
One common characteristic of subsequent Russian disinformation campaigns in the near 
abroad has been heavy reliance on state media. During the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia 
used state-owned media to spread disinformation and support its narrative.21 Restricted access to 
disputed areas for Western journalists during the war allowed Russian reporting on events to 
retain more legitimacy.22 Because Russian journalists were the only journalists allowed relatively 
free access to conflict areas, others writing about the conflict zones were largely forced to rely on 
Russian reports and were unable to contradict inaccuracies. Russia used this opportunity to 
change the narrative of the war by inflating the death count, accusing the Georgians of genocide 
and concealing damage done by Russians and separatists to Georgian villages.23 Even if Russian 
allegations were not entirely convincing, the confusion and inability to debunk Russia’s claims in 
 
19 Ibid., 53. 
20 Ibid., 54. 
21 Tom Parfitt, “Russia Exaggerating South Ossetian Death Toll to Provoke Revenge against Georgians, Says 
Human Rights Group,” The Guardian, August 13, 2008, sec. World news, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/aug/13/georgia.  
22 Sabrina Tavernise and Matt Siegel, “In Areas Under Russian Control, Limits for Western Media (Published 
2008),” The New York Times, August 18, 2008, sec. World, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/18/world/europe/18tblisi.html. 
23 Tavernise and Siegel, “In Areas Under Russian Control, Limits for Western Media (Published 2008).” Parfitt, 




combination with the short duration of the war helped Russia’s image and likely also hindered 
any international response to the invasion.  
The most substantial example of Russian disinformation in the near abroad occurred 
during the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Russia attempted to annex Crimea, which was followed by 
the invasion of Donetsk and Luhansk, border regions to Russia, with Russian military assistance. 
As of March 2021, the conflict was under a tenuous ceasefire with a recent buildup of Russian 
troops near the Ukrainian border.24 Russian state media coverage of the war in Ukraine one-
sidedly focused on casualties and damage caused by Ukrainian attacks.25 They also published 
provocative false stories, including reporting that a three-year-old had been crucified and 
allegedly using one actress to play multiple characters for interviews.26 Russian cyberattacks 
targeted government sites as well as power plants, and the Russian FSB, or security service, 
seized VKontakte servers for access to personal data and locations of millions of Ukrainians.27 
While hacking and social media are sometimes used by Russia as part of influence operations, 
the contemporaneous attacks on power plants and seizure of locations of Ukrainian soldiers were 
more a reflection of the hard power war than the propaganda campaign.28 
Russia also used state media in several cases to spread divisive disinformation throughout 
Western Europe, though to a lesser extent than in the near-abroad. Disinformation campaigns 
outside of the near-abroad present greater challenges for Russia due to the smaller ethnic-
 
24 “Ukraine Profile - Timeline,” BBC News, March 5, 2020, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
18010123; Michael R. Gordon and Georgi Kantchev, “Satellite Images Show Russia’s Expanding Ukraine 
Buildup,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2021, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/articles/satellite-images-show-
russias-expanding-ukraine-buildup-11618917238.  
25 Naja Bentzen and Martin Russell, “Russia’s Disinformation on Ukraine and the EU’s Response” (European 
Parliamentary Research Service, November 2015), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/571339/EPRS_BRI(2015)571339_EN.pdf. 
26 Bentzen and Russell, “Russia’s Disinformation on Ukraine and the EU’s Response.” 
27 Julia Summers, “Countering Disinformation: Russia’s Infowar in Ukraine,” The Henry M. Jackson School of 
International Studies (blog), October 25, 2017, https://jsis.washington.edu/news/russia-disinformation-ukraine/. 
28 Ibid.  
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Russian populations and weaker penetration of Russian-language media, as well as less close 
diplomatic ties. Recently, Russia has engaged in disinformation campaigns in numerous 
countries outside the near abroad including Germany and France. In 2016 in Germany, a young 
girl who was part of the ethnic Russian diaspora claimed to have been raped by men who looked 
like migrants, triggering protests in the Russian-German community.29 In addition to reporting 
heavily on the unverified and inflammatory story, Russian state media and officials created a 
narrative that her allegations were not being investigated due to political correctness, attempting 
to inflame anti-immigrant and anti-liberal sentiment.30 This use of Russian state media sources 
primarily targeting an ethnic Russian audience in Western Europe is consistent with the approach 
Russia has used in the near abroad.  
Russian actions in Europe fit with the broader pattern in its use of sharp power of mixing 
leaked information and outright disinformation to interfere with democracies’ domestic politics. 
During the 2017 French presidential election, emails from then presidential-candidate Emmanuel 
Macron’s campaign were hacked by Russian actors and leaked online by Russian state media.31 
Russian state media also spread disinformation about Macron, including that he was an 
American spy and was supported by Saudi Arabia, and published reports consistently biased 
against him.32 While Russia employs some state media efforts when interfering in Western 
countries or targeting populations other than ethnic Russians, campaigns outside the near abroad 
 
29 Ben Knight, “Teenage Girl Admits Making up Migrant Rape Claim That Outraged Germany,” The Guardian, 
January 31, 2016, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/31/teenage-girl-made-up-migrant-
claim-that-caused-uproar-in-germany; Eliot L Engel et al., “Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons 
from Europe,” Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 16, 2019, 78.  
30 Knight, “Teenage Girl Admits Making up Migrant Rape Claim That Outraged Germany.” 
31 Andy Greenberg, “The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election ‘Infrastructure’ | WIRED,” Wired, May 
9, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-confirms-russia-hacked-french-election-infrastructure/.  
32 Reuters Staff, “French Election Contender Macron Is Russian ‘fake News’ Target: Party Chief,” Reuters, February 
14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election-cyber-idU.S.KBN15S192; “Tackling Disinformation à 
La Française,” EU vs Disinformation, April 2, 2019, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/tackling-disinformation-a-la-francaise/.  
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seem to rely less heavily on state media and include more hacked information and covert social 
media disinformation. The shift to hacks and leaks probably results from perceptions in further 
afield countries and outside of ethnic Russian enclaves that Russian state-owned media is outside 
the mainstream or less trustworthy. Thus, Russian state-owned media could be a highly effective 
means to communicate a narrative to ethnic-minority Russians in Estonia or even Germany, but 
less so for most of the U.S. or U.K. audience. As a result, Russia has relied more heavily on 
tactics such as leaking hacked information through WikiLeaks, an entity perhaps perceived as 
more state neutral, as its disinformation campaigns have shifted to the West.  
Russia has engaged in a large number of other recent disinformation campaigns 
throughout Europe. Between 2014 and 2018, pro-Kremlin influence was alleged in the 2014 
Scottish independence referendum, 2014 Ukrainian elections, 2015 Bulgarian elections, 2015 
Dutch EU-Ukraine relationship referendum, 2016 Austrian elections, 2016 Italian constitutional 
referendum, 2017 German elections, 2017 Catalan referendum, 2018 Czech elections, 2018 
Italian elections, and 2018 Macedonian name referendum.33 Russian influence campaigns have 
continued in 2019 and onwards.34 Because of the persistent and growing Russian strategy of 
using sharp power to influence other countries, particularly through disinformation, cyberattacks, 
and biased Russian state-owned media, it is essential for states to develop comprehensive 




33 Eliot L Engel et al., “Russian Disinformation Attacks on Elections: Lessons from Europe,” Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, July 16, 2019, 78; https://www.brookings.edu/research/malevolent-soft-power-ai-and-the-threat-to-
democracy/ 
34 For example, interference in the recent 2020 U.S. elections: “Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Federal Elections,” 





 Bureaucratic politics explores one of the most significant assumptions in international 
relations: that states are the primary international actors. Although the state is often assumed to 
be a unitary actor with coherent and consistent preferences, states can be disaggregated to reveal 
multiple actors, ranging from elected officials to agencies, each of which may have different 
interests or approaches to foreign policy challenges. Bureaucratic politics focuses on how 
multiple sub-state actors interact to create policy, focusing on the rules that govern actors and the 
personal or organizational motives driving individuals, as well as how conflicts among actors 
lead to compromise. 
 
Bureaucratic Politics 
 Graham Allison’s Essence of Decision discusses three approaches to states’ decision 
making and uses them to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis. Allison describes three categories 
within existing theories of foreign policy action: the rational actor model, the organizational 
behavior model, and the governmental politics model.35 The latter two categories fall under the 
bureaucratic politics model, which I use to analyze my case studies.36 Allison asserts that the 
rational actor model represents the default that has long been used to analyze international 
relations and policy, while the other two models surfaced later to supplement shortcomings of 
the rational actor model. Allison applies all three models to analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
examining their analytical power and weaknesses.  
 
35 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 
1995), 4. 
36 Jerel A. Rosati, “Developing a Systematic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective,” 
World Politics 33, no. 2 (1981): 234–52, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010371.  
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 The rational actor model assumes that the entity creating foreign policy decisions is 
unitary, rational, and is located at the national level.37 The rational actor chooses a strategy in 
response to the international situation, balancing costs and benefits of different policies in order 
to find the net best option.38 The primary weakness of the rational actor model is that it ignores 
all actions and decisions at the sub-state level, such as those of sub-state organizations and 
individual bureaucrats and policymakers, despite the fact that their actions together combine to 
create state-level policy that may or may not effect a grand strategy intended at the state level. 
Another flaw is that when examining policies in retrospect, one can find a rational explanation 
for almost any policy, making it difficult to conclude retrospectively that policies were a 
uniquely rational choice, or inversely that they were irrational.39 The rational actor model is 
limited by the fact that it flattens a decision-making process that includes varied organizations 
and individuals interacting behind the scenes. Allison’s category of the rational actor model 
includes realism, structural realism, institutionalism, and liberalism because, notwithstanding 
their differences, all of those theories view states as unitary actors that make logical decisions. 
Allison also discusses how Thomas Schelling’s theory of deterrence, which is discussed in more 
depth below in the section on deterrence, assumes a rational actor model. 
 The organizational behavior model focuses on the sub-state level and the organizations 
involved in foreign policy formation, such as the State Department and Department of Defense 
(DoD), and implementation, and explains actions through bureaucratic patterns and 
organizational procedures.40 Organizations are the medium through which policy can be created, 
but they also have specific jurisdictions and are predisposed towards the status quo. The main 
 
37 Allison, Essence of Decision, 24. 
38 Ibid., 25. 
39 Ibid., 26. 
40 Ibid., 6. 
 
 20 
characteristics of the organizational behavior model are the distribution of responsibility among 
multiple organizations and the importance of organizations’ missions and scope limitations.  
 The third model of state decision making is governmental politics, a lens that delves even 
further into the details of decision making by examining individuals. These individuals, who 
make up organizations and in turn the state, can be motivated by state, organizational, or 
personal incentives.41 In this model, individual actors are able to bargain for their interests based 
on the amount of power they have. Presidents are able to influence policy by persuading and 
negotiating with other actors, such as Congress and executive agencies, for example.42 
 To test their explanatory power, Allison used the three different models to analyze the 
Cuban Missile Crisis case study. By analyzing the explanations offered by the organizational 
behavior and governmental politics models, Allison argues that, while the rational actor model 
can explain the end result, the two bureaucratic politics models reveal that the rational actor 
model failed to predict other potential outcomes. The two sub-state models can explain potential 
failures of states to make rational choices, and in Allison’s analysis reveal the risk of accidental 
nuclear war, a scenario not anticipated by rational-actor-based Mutually Assured Destruction 
models.43 
 In addition to Allison, the bureaucratic politics model has been used by several other 
scholars. Morton Halperin applied the bureaucratic politics model to the deployment of ABMs 
by President Lyndon Johnson in 1967, examining how the President, federal agencies, and 
Congress were able to exert influence on the decision process. Halperin concluded that the 
President made the decision to deploy the missiles as a compromise in response to bureaucratic, 
 
41 Ibid., 255. 
42 Ibid., 259. 
43 Ibid., 397. 
 
 21 
public, and Congressional pressure, and emphasized the importance of acknowledging the multi-
party nature of government decision making.44 Jerel Rosati used the bureaucratic policy model to 
analyze the bargaining process that resulted in the 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 
1), which pitted opposing bureaucratic predispositions against each other.45 
 I will analyze how the United States and United Kingdom formulated policy in response 
to Russian interference in their democratic processes in 2016 through the lens of the bureaucratic 
politics model. I focus on assessing the influence of several key aspects of the model: standard 
operating procedure, bargaining, and leadership. Bureaucratic politics developed during the 
bipolar, Mutually Assured Destruction international context of the Cold War, which has since 
ended, and Halperin and Allison focused on analyzing the U.S. political system. As the 
bureaucratic politics model was developed in the United States in response to conventional 
threats from the Soviet Union, it has limitations that may need to be supplemented in order to 
apply to modern foreign policy analysis.  
 
Institutional Structure and Foreign Policy Formation 
 The United States and United Kingdom both experienced Russian disinformation 
campaigns during major 2016 elections, but their responses differ in a major way potentially 
correlated with their distinct governmental structures. The U.S. policy formation response was 
implemented by a federal system with separation of powers among the executive, legislative and 
judicial branches, while the U.K. response was implemented by a parliamentary system that 
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lacks a separate executive and has more centralized power. Analysis of the policy-making 
process in presidential and parliamentary systems generally finds differences in how players 
interact and policy develops. For example, existence of more veto opportunities, as occurs in 
centralized governments, can create a choke point in which there are no independent lawmaking 
bodies or less agency ability to take independent action.46  
Kenneth Walz discusses the difference between the U.S. Presidential system and the U.K. 
parliamentary system in Theory of International Politics, contrasting the limitations on the U.K. 
Prime Minister’s power due to reliance on party support to remain in office with those of the 
U.S. President, who does not rely on Congress to remain in office but whose scope of action is 
limited without Congressional support.47 While U.K. Prime Ministers need support from their 
parties, and coalition members if in a coalition, U.S. Presidents have a greater ability to stay in 
office given their established terms but rely more on a power to persuade other decision makers 
to take action, particularly when their party does not have a strong majority. Waltz argues that by 
using comparative case studies, the effect of government structure on policymaking can be 
separated from other factors. He also asserts that structure affects the speed of policymaking.48 
For example, in systems where legislation needs to be reworked and bargained over, such as 
between the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, policymaking slows down. 
 In Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, George Tsebelis simplifies the 
government distinctions that affect policy making by categorizing systems based on how many 
actors can veto policy and how they interact, rather than using parliamentary, semi-presidential, 
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and presidential categories.49 His emphasis on veto players permits the incorporation of details 
beyond the structure of a government, allowing partisan divides in government such as a split 
Congress to be taken into account.50 Tsebelis criticizes the idea that politicians make rational 
choices as well as the idea that governments can be neatly sorted into different categories such as 
presidential and parliamentary for analysis, making the point that considerable diversity exists 
even within the category of parliamentary democracies. In my analysis, I will be mindful of how 
these institutional differences interact within a bureaucratic politics framework. 
 
Deterrence 
 Deterrence, in particular cyber deterrence, might be expected to be an important goal of 
policy responding to disinformation campaigns and provides interesting context for the case 
studies. However, the rational actor model cannot be effectively applied to analyze these case 
studies due to its reliance on having a comprehensive account of all government policies that 
could create a deterrent, presenting an insurmountable challenge to research relying on the public 
domain where some policy making is covert. Deterrence theory is categorized by Allison as a 
subset of rational actor theory as it seeks to explain state actions by assuming that states make 
logical decisions. The theory of deterrence, or the use of threats to prevent an actor from doing 
something, has existed since at least the time of Thucydides in 5th Century BC Greece and in the 
modern tradition has been used in conventional force analysis. Unitary rational actors are 
important to deterrence because deterrence assumes that states make accurate cost-benefit 
calculations or at least have a self-preservation instinct.51 Deterrence falls under a larger category 
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of theories that Thomas Schelling discusses in his book Arms and Influence, the indirect use of 
force. Deterrence theory has been used by Waltz to make the case for a nuclear Iran and by 
Frank Zagare to analyze U.S. deterrence of Israel in 1967.52   
Deterrence is an alternative to force that states can use to achieve foreign policy goals 
and requires clear signaling to the enemy state. Traditionally, states use military force directly to 
capture an objective or physically prevent an enemy from taking an objective.53 However, states 
can also in many cases use indirect force to achieve their goals. Schelling discusses the indirect 
use of force in which the ability to harm an opponent is used to bargain so that another state will 
either refrain from doing an undesired action, which constitutes deterrence, or do a desired 
action, which constitutes compellence.54 Both deterrence and compellence fall under the category 
of coercion and generally require the same conditions, though compellance is more challenging 
because it attempts to change established behavior. In order for a hypothetical state A to 
successfully coerce state B, state A needs to communicate clearly what it wants from state B and 
what it will do if state B does not comply. In addition, state A must threaten something that state 
B cares about, so that state B would experience a worse outcome if it did not comply. State A 
must also make state B believe that it has the capability of carrying out its threat, for example 
that it possesses missiles capable of reaching state B, and that it is willing to do so and would 
follow through if state B ignored the threat.55  Schelling applies deterrence theory to a 
hypothetical Soviet invasion of the United States, arguing that if the United States allowed the 
Soviet Union to invade California, the Soviet Union would also attempt to invade Texas on the 
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basis that the United States was not committed to defending Western states. He uses this example 
to illustrate how signaling and willingness are an important component of deterrence.56 
 
Cyber Deterrence 
 Cyber deterrence introduces some challenges relevant to the bigger picture of countering 
foreign disinformation campaigns. Schelling lays out the basic components needed for 
deterrence. However, because he wrote about conventional and nuclear war in the 1960s, 
Schelling’s approach to deterrence theory does not fully address certain difficulties with 
deterrence that arise when attempting to deter aggression in cyberspace, including cyberattacks 
and disinformation campaigns. In recent years deterrence has been extended for applications to 
unconventional conflict such as in cyberspace. Cyber deterrence is deterring cyberspace attacks 
by other countries; however, it does not necessarily limit deterrent options to cyberspace. For 
example, a country might threaten sanctions in retaliation for a cyberattack. Deterrence in the 
context of election interference, including cyber deterrence, presents several complications.  
Scholars have raised concerns about the viability of deterrence in cyberspace including 
evaluating the seriousness of attacks, escalation, and attribution. In 2017, Joseph Nye questioned 
whether deterrence was possible in cyberspace.57 One of the main challenges is the sheer quantity 
and variety of cyberattacks.58 Compared with a military invasion, it is less clear when 
cyberattacks cross a threshold and merit retaliation.59 In addition, attributing cyberattacks can be 
difficult, and if an attack cannot confidently be attributed, the victim may not retaliate, making it 
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easier for perpetrators to avoid consequences and harder to deter attacks.60 In Cyberdeterrence 
and Cyberwar, Martin Libicki explores the differences between conventional and cyber 
deterrence. In addition to the issue of attribution, he discusses the risk of escalation. In 
conventional or nuclear war, deterrence is less complicated because by the time an actor 
retaliates, it is typically because another actor has done something extreme, like begun an 
invasion or launched a nuclear attack. In cases of physical conflict, the level of damage and 
appropriate corresponding retaliation is fairly easy to judge. However, in cyber deterrence, there 
is a risk that retaliation will be an overreaction to the original attack and cause an escalation of 
the conflict.61 A physical retaliation to an instigating cyberattack could lead the perpetrator of the 
cyberattack to retaliate in kind with another physical attack, leading to a cycle of escalatory 
retaliation. As many cyberattacks are low stakes compared with uses of hard power, it is less 
likely that states will be willing to risk escalation to retaliate. 
While recent literature exploring how deterrence can apply in cyberspace refers to 
cyberattacks, not disinformation campaigns, and little has been written about deterrence of 
disinformation, the same complications of deterrence also apply to disinformation. It is difficult 
to determine where a disinformation campaign falls on the spectrum from small annoyance to 
major damage and therefore when it merits retaliation, especially because measuring the 
magnitude and determining causation of effects of state-sponsored disinformation is challenging. 
It can also be difficult to attribute disinformation to a state with confidence, as was the case with 
the 2007 Estonian attacks. Thus, even when it appears clear that a state has conducted a 
disinformation campaign, challenges both of confirming affiliation of certain actions and of 
demonstrating linkage of damage with the state campaign leave the size and damage of the 
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campaign unclear, making retaliation less likely. States are also less likely to respond 
aggressively if they worry about escalating the conflict. These structural pressures that dissuade 
states from retaliating against cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns interfere with 
deterrence because aggressor states also understand the incentives against retaliation and 
therefore can feel more confident that they face minimal penalties, if any, for cyberattacks and 
disinformation campaigns. 
Although deterrence sheds interesting light on how Cold-War-era theories can shift in 
light of modern challenges, I opt not to use the deterrence literature in my analytical framework 
for several reasons. Bureaucratic politics analyses the policy process, while deterrence focuses 
on assessing policy outcomes and whether or not they are consistent with successful deterrence. 
Because of evidence limitations, assessing outcomes in policy countering foreign disinformation 
based on information in the public domain presents significant if not insurmountable challenges. 
Deterrence focuses on the end result of the policy process, which either creates a successful 
deterrence relying on communication and legitimacy or fails to do so. Even in the absence of an 
effective overt deterrent policy, the United States and United Kingdom may have covertly issued 
threats or taken action against Russia. Therefore, evaluating the communication and legitimacy 
of known U.S. and U.K. actions would not give an accurate assessment of whether the United 
States or United Kingdom created effective deterrence. In addition, while deterrence theory 
creates specific criteria against which to assess policies, it excludes non-deterrence policy 
options, including defense, as well as policies that rely on international norms and institutions to 
exert pressure to stop interference.62 While lack of access to a complete picture of the policy 
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response prevents my from applying deterrence literature in my analysis, deterrence theory 
informs my conclusion, as well as the bigger picture of how the democracies can respond to 
disinformation. Deterrence not only offers an appealing policy option, but the literature also 
discusses important challenges, such as escalation, attribution, and rapidly advancing technology, 
to state responses to disinformation campaigns. 
 
Bureaucratic Decision Making: Challenges in Responding to Election Interference 
 Disinformation presents a complex problem for democracies, and the involvement of 
multiple sub-state actors in government responses makes bureaucratic politics a useful 
framework for analyzing governments’ responses.  Disinformation spread to influence or disrupt 
an election threatens free and fair voting, a core aspect of democracies. This fundamental 
entanglement in domestic politics complicates responses to election interference.  Perceptions 
that election interference is biased in support of one candidate or party have the potential to 
undermine election integrity further because acknowledging election interference, necessary for 
the clear signaling for deterrence, could damage the democratic legitimacy of individual 
politicians or parties in power. Specific election interference could incentivize some politicians 
to downplay interference to avoid undermining their legitimacy, making them less likely to 
promote and support an aggressive response. The position of foreign election interference at the 
intersection of domestic and international considerations increases the challenges to an effective 
response as foreign policy organizations in the government are logically oriented towards 
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international issues and may not be well equipped to deal with issues that are as much domestic 
as they are foreign.  
Bureaucratic politics is particularly salient to applications to foreign disinformation 
policy because it considers the multiple foreign policy decision makers within the government, 
as well as both individual and organizational influences. Bureaucratic politics directs attention to 
factors that affect the decision-making process including institutional standard operating 
procedure, bargaining, and leadership. When faced with the challenge of their status as 
democracies responding to interference in an election, both the United States and United 
Kingdom were viewed as responding in an uncoordinated manner or inadequately by the media 
and external experts. However, paradoxically, their responses seem to have differed 
significantly, with the United Kingdom offering a much less robust policy response, at least 






Chapter 2: U.S. and U.K. Encounters with Russian Disinformation 
 Chapter 2 provides an introduction to important factors and assumptions of the 
bureaucratic politics model and introduces the case studies that are used in the analysis in 
Chapter 3. In Chapter 2, I begin by briefly discussing the factors that bureaucratic politics uses to 
analyze how governments form foreign policy. Next, I provide background for the U.S. case 
study, presenting what happened in the 2016 election to instigate the U.S. response, followed by 
an overview of the U.S. response. Then, I provide background and an overview of the U.K. case 
study. In doing so, I highlight the similar tactics of Russian disinformation, in contrast with the 
divergent responses of the United States and United Kingdom. 
 
Predicted Policy Process 
 The bureaucratic politics model provides a framework for predicting how U.S. and U.K. 
policy actors would be expected to respond to an event like the Russian disinformation 
campaigns in 2016. While the model does not necessarily predict specific outcomes, bureaucratic 
politics proposes factors that contribute to how policy is formed. I focus on testing three factors 
relevant to the U.S. and U.K. cases: standard operating procedure, leadership, and bargaining. 
 In the U.S. government, beyond the constitutional separation of powers among the 
executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, authority is divided up among departments and 
offices by purpose, with the State Department focused on diplomacy, for example, while the 
DoD is in charge of military action. Actors’ options, or standard operating procedure options, are 
limited and guided by their responsibilities in the government. In addition, bureaucratic politics 
predicts that in a policy formation process, one actor will coordinate the response, establishing 
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leadership, determined by whose area of responsibility or mission the decision falls under.63 For 
example, the State Department could have primary power over diplomatic negotiations with 
North Korea, consulting other agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 
Cyber Command (the U.S. military command covering cyberspace) and Congress, in order to 
create a policy. However, while one actor leads the response and is responsible for coordinating 
and implementing the policy as the point person, the actual policy comes about as a result of 
bargaining and communication among stakeholders reflecting their different interests. 
Governmental actors have specific responsibilities, as well as past experience in 
responding to challenges.64 Typically, actors work within their defined area of responsibility in 
the government. When changes are necessitated by disasters or significant disruptions, 
organizations rely on past experience to adjust to the new situation.65 While Russian information 
warfare is seen as somewhat novel, especially against the United States and United Kingdom, 
there is historical precedent for interference in other countries’ domestic politics. Therefore, it 
would make sense that relevant actors, such as the State Department, FBI, and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), might turn to precedent to guide action. The President and Congress 
might also rely on precedent somewhat for guidance; however, these actors generally do not 
have the same institutional memory because of turnover and partisan shifts. Instead, partisan 
actors have particularly strong individual motivations, such as the desire to be reelected or gain 
influence. Bureaucratic politics also predicts that the President would rely on persuading or 
negotiating with agencies, such as DHS, FBI, and DoD, to gain their compliance with the chief 
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executive’s preferred policy.66 While Presidents have strong influence, they are not always 
successful, and it is particularly challenging for Presidents to prevent policy actions by other 
organizations. 
 
Russian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 
Russian election interference leading up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 
represented the first high profile, coordinated domestic or foreign attempt to influence and 
mislead U.S. voters during an election, bringing disinformation and election interference to new 
prominence.67 The effects of and specific motivations behind Russia’s actions have been widely 
debated; indeed, the very existence of Russian interference has been questioned, particularly by 
former President Trump and his surrogates. However, investigative reports have established 
more details over time, and experts now widely agree that the Russian government engaged in an 
organized campaign to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election, with remaining uncertainty 
primarily centering around the campaign’s goals and effectiveness.68 Resulting fears about the 
security and independence of the U.S. electoral process, as well as the potential for future 
election interference, prompted U.S. federal government investigations and actions. Russian 
actions in the 2016 election were sufficiently threatening to U.S. democracy and damaging to 
public perception that the U.S. government would be expected to have responded strongly to 
preclude and deter future Russian and foreign electoral interference. This policy overview 
describes publicly disclosed U.S. responses to Russian interference in late 2016 through the 2018 
midterms. Most broadly, it demonstrates that the policy response was neither as coordinated nor 
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robust as a bureaucratic politics approach might anticipate. This section provides a summary of 
broadly accepted events in Russia’s interference in the 2016 election, reviewing the role of actors 
including the Democratic National Committee (DNC), Russian Main Directorate intelligence 
agency (GRU), and IRA. 
 
Russian Disinformation and Hacking 
The high profile and contentious nature of the 2016 Presidential election and the 
extensive news coverage the campaign generated provided an ideal opportunity for interference 
and dissemination of disinformation. Private and government investigations have established that 
Russia began preparing to interfere in the U.S. election as early as 2014, and its hacking, leaking, 
and social media campaign peaked in mid to late 2016.69 Russian election interference included 
coordinated social media campaigns, sophisticated hacking operations against political groups 
and election infrastructure, and leaking information with the help of groups such as Wikileaks. In 
addition, American news media and individuals on social media amplified Russian interference 
by further spreading controversial or engaging information.  
Beginning in March 2016, the GRU attempted to compromise emails and private 
computer systems related to Hillary Clinton’s Presidential campaign and the Democratic Party.70 
The hackers used phishing emails to install malware on computers connected to the Democratic 
Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and then DNC networks. The malware allowed the 
GRU to track keystrokes and take screenshots, providing access to emails, campaign research, 
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and staffer bank account information.71 The leaked information included disparaging comments 
made internally about Democratic Presidential primary competitor Senator Bernie Sanders.72 
After acquiring sensitive, controversial information from the DNC, the information was leaked 
online through a variety of channels not directly associated with Russia, including WikiLeaks, 
DCLeaks, and Guccifer 2.0, that were designed to obscure the source of the information.73 
Among the leaked DNC emails was one discussing President Barack Obama’s reticence to help 
fundraise, exclaiming “He really won’t go up 20 minutes for $350k? THAT’S f---ing stupid,” 
and an email suggesting attacking candidate Bernie Sanders for alleged atheism.74 Overall, the 
Russian government attempted to create division within the Democratic party, as well as stoke 
animus against Hillary Clinton. 
In addition, throughout the 2016 election campaign, Russian actors such as the IRA used 
networks of accounts on global social media platforms to engage U.S. voters and spread 
disinformation. Employees of the IRA used bots and networks of accounts to spread false and 
divisive content by posting from accounts impersonating Americans, sharing each other’s posts 
to spread the content further. IRA employees posed as both conservative and liberal personas, 
often presenting themselves as U.S. organizations affiliated with politics or grassroots 
organizations such as Black Lives Matter or the Tea Party, allowing them to feed off those 
groups’ popularity.75 In addition, the IRA purchased political advertisements on social media 
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sites, including an advertisement recruiting young people for a pro-Trump group labelled 
#KIDSFORTRUMP, and directly messaged genuine U.S. political groups such as regional Tea 
Party groups in an attempt to cooperate in planning events.76 The IRA additionally made use of 
bot networks, large numbers of automated accounts, to amplify their posts.77 By relying on these 
strategies to increase their chance of going viral, IRA posts reached at least 29 million 
Americans on Facebook alone during the election campaign.78 
The impact of Russian disinformation was not limited to cyberspace. The IRA organized 
real-world events remotely from Russia by creating and using paid Facebook advertising to 
promote events. As noted in the Introduction, IRA-created Facebook pages called The Heart of 
Texas and United Muslims of America organized a simultaneous protest and counter-protest in 
Houston in May 2016.79 According to photos of the event, the event drew at least several dozen 
protestors on each side.80 In addition, in another case, an IRA-backed Facebook page called 
BlackMattersUS organized a march from Union Square to Trump Tower in New York City 
attended by between five and ten thousand people.81 
According to U.S. intelligence committee assessments, information published on Russian 
news sites was consistent with Russia’s approval of Trump and disapproval of Clinton, and 
helped spread hacked emails from the Clinton campaign and DNC.82 During the 2016 election, 
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Russian state-owned English-language media, including RT, supported Donald Trump through 
English-language articles and videos and argued that he was unfairly targeted by traditional, 
establishment U.S. media sites, including in a video featuring WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange 
titled “Trump Will Not Be Permitted To Win.”83 Russian state-owned media portrayed Hillary 
Clinton as corrupt and extensively covered the hacked DNC emails.84 Coverage of Clinton 
included videos titled “Julian Assange Special: Do WikiLeaks Have the E-mail That’ll Put 
Clinton in Prison?” and “Clinton and ISIS Funded by the Same Money.”85 
In addition to disinformation-related election interference, a U.S. Senate Intelligence 
investigation concluded that Russia engaged in cyberattacks against U.S. election infrastructure, 
including voting websites, machines, and companies that provide voting services and machines.86 
This effort was less high profile, and despite successfully gaining access to some state election 
systems, Russia is not known to have exploited its success.87 However, Russia could have 
potentially used its access to disrupt U.S. voting systems, for example by changing voter 
registration information or even result tallies, which would have caused confusion and mistrust.88  
The U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence found there was no evidence that vote tallies 
or voter rolls were changed, and Russia’s efforts are viewed by U.S. intelligence agencies as 
probable reconnaissance in anticipation of future efforts or an attempt to disrupt confidence in 
electoral systems. 89 
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U.S. Perceptions of Russian Motivations 
U.S. perceptions of Russia’s goals in its election interference campaign have could 
affected how threatened the United States felt, and therefore the strength of U.S. response. 
Factors affecting the U.S. response will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Possible 
Russian goals include changing the election outcome, undermining confidence in U.S. 
democracy, and increasing polarization in U.S. politics, though these objectives are not mutually 
exclusive. Though there are a number of potential Russian motives for the campaign, the most 
prominent interpretation, including by U.S. intelligence agencies, is that “Russia’s goals were to 
undermine public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her 
electability and potential presidency” as well as “help President-elect Trump’s election 
chances.”90 Other proposed separate or additional motivations for Russia include revenge against 
alleged previous U.S. interference in Russian democracy, the desire to weaken the U.S. 
Presidency, and general “ambivalence towards the West.”91 Given that the Russian government 
has not openly admitted to electoral interference or discussed its motivations, assertions about 
motive are based on either non-public, classified information or strategic and historic analysis of 
Russia’s actions. However, for the purposes of this project, it is not necessary to know the 




90 Fiona Hill, “3 Reasons Russia’s Vladimir Putin Might Want to Interfere in the U.S. Presidential Elections,” 
Brookings (blog), August 3, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/08/03/3-reasons-russias-
vladimir-putin-might-want-to-interfere-in-the-u-s-presidential-elections/; “Assessing Russian Activities and 
Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections.”; Mary Jalonick and Eric Tucker, “Senate Panel Backs Assessment That Russia 
Interfered in 2016,” AP News, April 21, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/d094918c0421b872eac7dc4b16e613c7. 
91 Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far,” The New 
York Times, September 20, 2018, sec. U.S., https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-
interference-election-trump-clinton.html; Hill, “3 Reasons Russia’s Vladimir Putin Might Want to Interfere in the 
U.S. Presidential Elections.” 
 
 38 
Effects of Election Interference in the United States 
 
 Conclusions about the effectiveness of Russian election interference vary because the 
assessment depends significantly on what Russia’s goals are believed to have been, which as 
noted cannot be conclusively determined. In addition, while the complexity and multiple inputs 
involved make it impossible to reach definitive conclusions about Russia’s success in, for 
example, changing the election result, there is a correlation between Russia’s actions and an 
increase in U.S. political polarization. Without being able to establish causation, in 2016 U.S. 
partisanship hit a new high, with over 50% of voters viewing the other party very unfavorably, 
while confidence in U.S. elections seemed unaffected both during and after the election.92 
 Although investigations found no evidence that Russia exploited its access to election 
infrastructure to change vote tallies or voter rolls, given the large number of impressions, or 
views and interactions, that the IRA alone achieved on social media, IRA propaganda may have 
had some effect on voters’ choices.93 It is impossible to know how many voters, if any, the IRA 
and other sources of Russian disinformation may have swayed, and because of Donald Trump’s 
small margin of victory in crucial states in the 2016 election, multiple factors could have tipped 
the election.  
 According to the 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment and Senate Intelligence 
Committee Reports, it is more likely that Russia’s primary objective was to further polarize 
American voters and reduce confidence in U.S. democracy, with any ability to swing the election 
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in favor of a friendlier candidate being tangential and perhaps unexpected.94 Like influence on 
voter decisions, polarization and mistrust are subjective, and a direct cause-and-effect linkage is 
difficult to establish.  
 
U.S. Response to Russian Election Interference 
 
 The U.S. government adopted a number of policies in response to Russian interference 
with the 2016 U.S. election. My analysis includes official federal government actions in response 
to 2016 Russian disinformation, including reports, hearings, legislation, executive orders, and 
actions taken under existing law. I examined the congressional records for relevant bills, in 
addition to relevant committee websites for hearings and press releases. In addition, I looked for 
all Whitehouse.gov press releases and executive orders on Russian disinformation. In order to 
find less-publicized actions such as Cyber Command operations, as well as assemble a complete 
picture of U.S. actions, I consulted think tank reports on U.S. policy actions. I exclude lower 
investment and impact activities such as public remarks by the President, legislators, and agency 
spokespeople and the Presidential signing of previously passed bills. However, relevant public 
remarks will be included in my analysis of U.S. policy formation and actors. I include federal 
government policies implemented prior to the 2018 U.S. midterm elections, including a few 
policies that were put in place before the end of the 2016 election as preliminary responses once 
the United States realized that Russia was interfering in the election. Policies established after 
the 2018 election are excluded for several reasons. First, policies implemented after 2018 were 
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delayed enough to not be in place to protect the next major U.S. election after 2016 and thus 
were too late to deter Russia from further interference past 2016. Second, whether anti-
disinformation policies put in place after the 2018 election represent responses to Russian 
election interference in 2016 or new responses to interference in 2018 is ambiguous. In addition, 
other than the Mueller report, which primarily focused on the Trump campaign, there were no 
major public actions in process before 2018 that had yet to be completed or published in an 
interim report so post-2018 legislation or prosecutions would either have been non-public or 
started after and potentially in response to the 2018 midterms. 
 
U.S. Actors 
 The three types of U.S. actors involved in federal disinformation policies are the 
President, the legislative branch or Congress, and executive branch agencies. Actions taken by 
each group vary because of their different legal authority. For example, legislative policies 
mostly consist of reports and laws passed by Congress. In addition, the elected, more partisan 
character of the executive and legislative branches contrast with that of the executive agencies, 
which include a multitude of career bureaucrats and are seen as comparatively objective and 
nonpartisan.  
The executive branch, despite its traditionally central role in foreign policy, has done 
relatively little with regards to disinformation in the 2016-18 period, with the bulk of Presidential 
actions consisting of supporting other actors such as Congress and the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI), as well as intermittent public statements. In part this is probably because the 
ability to negotiate treaties, an essential part of executive power over foreign policy, has not been 
used in disinformation policy thus far. As a result, beyond a small number of executive orders, 
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most Presidential involvement in anti-disinformation policy has been limited to signing or 
implementing legislative policy through executive agencies and making public statements about 
the threat of Russian interference or lack thereof.95 Executive disinformation policies consist of 
two distinct periods: the Obama era, covering a few months before and immediately after the 
election, and the Trump era, covering the majority of the U.S. response through 2018. 
Presidential executive orders on disinformation together compose one sequence, in which 
President Trump extended a prior executive order issued by President Obama that created 
sanctions against top Russian intelligence actors and companies involved in the campaign for 
election interference.96 
The legislative branch has used three main methods to respond to Russian interference: 
legislation, hearings, and committee reports on Russian disinformation. Between 2016 and 2018, 
Congress introduced several bills in response to disinformation and passed several pieces of 
legislation as part of larger bills. Congress also held five open hearings on Russian 
disinformation in the 2016 election, and several committees published reports investigating 
Russian interference.97 
U.S. executive agencies represent the third group of actors involved in the policy 
response to Russian election interference. Federal agencies, including the Intelligence 
Community, the umbrella organization for all U.S. intelligence agencies organized by the DNI, 
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as well as individual agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA), DHS, and FBI, as 
well as DoJ, are the most varied policy actor group, differing in size, powers, and history. Due to 
their significant number of career bureaucrats with varying personal party affiliations, they are 
generally considered nonpartisan relative to elected offices such as the Presidency and Congress 
and often work together to counter disinformation, engaging in overlapping categories of actions 
such as investigation and issuance of reports. Overall, executive agencies have taken the largest 
quantity of actions; however, this stems in part from the large number of agencies involved in 
responding to Russian election interference, as well as the iterative nature of some reports and 
investigations. Collectively, executive agencies were primarily involved in investigating and 
reporting on Russian disinformation, while some agencies such as the NSA and DoJ took action 
based on their delegated powers. 
 
U.S. Response Timeline 
Between 2016 and 2018, federal actions evolved from preliminary reports and hearings to 
sanctions and prosecutions, as well as organizational changes to help improve future federal 
coordination and response. The U.S. response to Russian election interference appears to have 
been uncoordinated, primarily consisting of investigations, hearings, and reports, as well as 
indictments and sanctions that will not realistically affect the targeted individuals. While the U.S. 
took some punitive actions, those prosecutions and sanctions impact a small number of low-level 
players on the Russian side, as opposed to broad, aggressive sanctions or ones targeted against 
key decision makers. Overall, the United States lacked a coordinated, whole-of-government 




The initial U.S. response to Russian interference was slowed by President Obama’s 
concerns about appearing to interfere in the ongoing democratic election or undermining public 
confidence in voting systems.98 The first federal response to the 2016 Russian election 
interference was not until October 7, 2016 when a statement was issued by the Intelligence 
Community attributing the email hackings against Democrats and the Clinton campaign during 
the election to Russia, arguing that the hackings were believed to be ordered by senior-most 
Russian officials and stating that state election systems had been scanned though those actions 
could not yet be attributed to Russia.99  
In December 2016, shortly after the election, Congress passed the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017, which established the Department of State 
Global Engagement Center.100 The Global Engagement Center was established to lead U.S. 
government efforts to understand and counter foreign disinformation undermining U.S. national 
security.101 
On December 29, 2016, the DHS, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), 
and the FBI issued a Joint Analytical Report (JAR) building on the brief October statement.102 
 
98 Eric Lipton, David Sanger, and Scott Shane, “The Perfect Weapon: How Russian Cyberpower Invaded the U.S. - 
The New York Times,” The New York Times, December 13, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/politics/russia-hack-election-dnc.html. “Senate Report Faults Obama 
Administration’s Paralysis on Russian Election Interference,” POLITICO, February 6, 2020, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/02/06/obama-russia-senate-intel-committee-report-111388. 
99 DHS Press Office, “Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence on Election Security,” Department of Homeland Security, October 7, 2016, 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national. 
100 John McCain, “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017,” § 1287 (2016), 
https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ328/PLAW-114publ328.pdf. 
101 John McCain, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. 
102 “Joint DHS, ODNI, FBI Statement on Russian Malicious Cyber Activity,” FBI National Press Office, December 
29, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/joint-dhs-odni-fbi-statement-on-russian-malicious-cyber-
activity; Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, “Grizzly Steppe – Russian 




The JAR primarily provided technical details on the attacks and was meant to provide private 
sector companies with the ability to identify and report attacks.103  
In addition in December 2016, in the first attempt at retaliation, President Obama issued 
an executive order sanctioning Russian intelligence agencies, officers, and companies involved 
in the election interference and authorizing Treasury to impose sanctions for disinformation or 
cyberattacks.104 However, President Obama did not directly retaliate against Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, and the targeted individuals likely had no U.S. assets that would be impacted.105 
President Obama also announced the closing of two Russian compounds in the U.S. used for 
intelligence purposes and expelled 35 Russian diplomats.106 While the diplomatic actions were 
taken through the authority of the State Department, they were part of President Obama’s 
coordinated response to Russian election interference and announced as part of his 
administration’s policy response.107  
2017 
On January 6, 2017, the ODNI issued the first substantive investigation of election 
interference, an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) that concluded that Russia interfered 
in the U.S. election in favor of President Trump and additionally that the interference was 
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ordered by President Putin.108 In addition, the intelligence agencies concluded that Russia posed a 
threat to future elections.109 This report was the basis for the January 10 Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence hearing, and also created controversy in Congress and U.S. news media over 
whether Russian interference was in favor of Trump.110  
 During the first half of 2017, various Congressional committees held hearings on Russian 
disinformation. On January 10, 2017, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held the first 
of several open hearings, and included the DNI and the Directors of the CIA, NSA, and FBI.111 
The hearing discussed the ICA from January 6, 2017 that concluded that Russian interference in 
the 2016 U.S. election was ordered by Putin and that Russia wanted to help President-Elect 
Trump.112 After Donald Trump’s January 20 inauguration, in March 2017, the Committee held 
two back-to-back hearings called "A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence 
Campaigns,” providing an overview of past Russian disinformation, including that related to the 
2016 election.113 In June 2017, the Committee held a hearing covering what happened in the 2016 
election and looking ahead to elections in 2018 and 2020.114 The hearing included two panels, the 
first comprised of FBI and DHS officials and focused on the events of 2016 and the federal 
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response.115 The second panel included state election officials and was meant to explore how the 
federal government could assist states to secure election infrastructure.116 
In August 2017, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act (CAATSA) of 2017, which codified into law sanctions imposed by President 
Obama’s December 2016 executive order, preventing President Trump from lifting them through 
executive order.117 In addition, it mandated new sanctions for election interference and expanded 
existing sanctions.118 In both 2017 and 2018, President Trump issued Presidential memoranda 
implementing the 2017 and 2018 CAATSA.119 However, President Trump expressed disapproval 
of CAATSA, particularly sanctions against Russia, and the policy was driven by Congress not 
the President.120  
In Fall 2017, FBI Director Christopher Wray created the Foreign Interference Task Force 
(FITF).121 The FBI has primary responsibility for investigating foreign influence, and the FITF is 
involved in investigating as well as communicating threats by foreign entities to other 
government and private entities.122 In addition, in November 2017, the DoJ mandated that RT and 
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its global distribution agent register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).123 
FARA requires foreign agents to register as well as label their broadcasts for transparency.124 
This decision was partially based on the 2017 ICA, which included discussion of RT’s 
involvement in 2016 election interference.125 In December 2017, Congress passed the Fiscal Year 
2018 NDAA. The legislation included a section building on a bill that had been previously been 
introduced in the Senate, called the Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act.126 
The 2018 NDAA required cooperation between the DoD and the State Department on foreign 
disinformation and strengthened the Global Engagement Center.127 
2018 
In February 2018, the DOJ charged 13 Russian individuals and three companies for their 
interference in the U.S. political system, including the 2016 Presidential election, as part of the 
special counsel investigation into the 2016 election.128 Twelve of the individuals were employees 
of the IRA, while the last one was Yevgeniy Prigozhin, the oligarch who funded IRA 
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activities.129 The charges related to the activities of the IRA.130 In March 2018, President Trump 
signed an executive order extending the emergency declaration from Obama’s December 2016 
executive order by one year.131 This extended the specific sanctions in the individual order, as 
well as the authority of the Department of Treasury to sanction individuals under it. The House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report in March 2018 on its investigation 
of Russia’s interference in the 2016 election agreeing with most of the Intelligence Community’s 
prior assessments, except for the allegation that President Putin preferred Trump to Clinton.132 In 
June 2018, the Committee had a hearing on the U.S. policy response to Russian election 
interference that involved both looking back at 2016 as well as recommendations for future 
policies to combat election interference.133 
While the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence did not publish a final report on 
Russian election interference before the 2018 midterms, in July 2018 the Committee published 
its findings to date.134 The preliminary report supported the January 2017 ICA’s findings, both 
through examination of the evidence as well as intelligence agencies’ analytical processes, and 
agreed with the assessment that Russia favored President Trump in the 2016 election.135 In 
addition, in July 2018, the DoJ brought charges against eleven additional Russian individuals, 
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primarily for hacking into organizations involved in Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaign and 
leaking hacked documents.136 The charges were brought against the individual Russian 
intelligence officers who carried out the scheme, not higher-level policymakers who might have 
ordered the attack.137 
During 2018, the federal government also prepared for potential Russian interference in 
the upcoming midterm elections. Following the July indictment, U.S. Cyber Command and the 
NSA engaged in cyber operations preparing preemptively for the 2018 midterm elections and 
reportedly both outed Russian operatives and passed information to the DHS and the FBI.138 In 
July 2018, the DOJ Cyber Digital Task Force issued its first report on how the DOJ was dealing 
with cyber threats.139 The report described DOJ preparations for the 2018 midterms, including 
investigating and prosecuting violations of FARA, sharing threat information, and working with 
private companies.140 
The 2019 NDAA was passed in August 2018, before the midterm elections. The 2019 
NDAA modified the Global Engagement Center’s description to add greater emphasis on 
protecting U.S. and allies’ national security interests.141 In addition, it directed the President to 
designate a National Security Council (NSC) employee to coordinate executive agencies’ anti-
disinformation efforts.142  
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In September 2018, shortly before the U.S. midterm elections, President Trump issued an 
executive order requiring post-election assessments of foreign interference in U.S. elections 
coordinated by the DNI and sanctions in response to election interference.143 The September 
2018 executive order built upon the previous emergency declarations in March 2018 and 
December 2016, and was intended to establish sanctions for interference in the November 2018 
midterms and a consistent post-incident analysis process. 
 Overall, the public U.S. government response to Russian election interference seems 
surprisingly limited, particularly in light of the high profile and high stakes nature of the Russian 
campaign. Russia attempted to disrupt the U.S. Presidential election, and the U.S. response 
primarily consisted of holding investigative hearings and issuing reports. Despite a few 
prosecutions and sanctions, there appear not to have been deterrent or retaliatory measures 
against high-level officials in positions to control Russian election interference policy, such as 
President Putin. Without retaliatory actions against decision makers, U.S. actions cannot serve as 
effective deterrence against future Russian interference in U.S. elections. While actions such as 
FARA designation for RT potentially help the U.S. achieve some deterrence through denial, 
making it more difficult for Russia to influence U.S. voters, they do not meaningfully increase 
the cost to decision makers and motivate them not to interfere.  
 
Russian Interference in the 2016 U.K. Brexit Referendum 
 
At the same time as the U.S. presidential campaign was ramping up and Russian actors 
were hacking the DNC and spreading disinformation, a shorter, more limited election 
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interference campaign took place in the United Kingdom. In 2016, the United Kingdom had a 
referendum on whether to leave the EU.144 The Brexit referendum campaign was contentious, 
involving emotive rhetoric about sovereignty, healthcare funding, and loss of economic 
prosperity.145 On June 23, 2016, a slim majority of the United Kingdom voted to leave the EU, 
triggering Prime Minister David Cameron’s resignation and a separation process that has only 
recently been concluded in January 2021.146  
In late 2015, as the EU referendum campaign was beginning in the United Kingdom, 
Arron Banks, one of the co-founders of the Leave.EU campaign and the largest individual 
political donor in the United Kingdom, met with the Russian ambassador to the United Kingdom, 
allegedly discussing the upcoming EU referendum and opportunities to invest in gold.147 The 
source and extent of Banks’ wealth is unclear, and given his numerous overseas business 
connections and offers, some have charged that the money for his donations came indirectly 
from outside the United Kingdom, funneling Russian money into U.K. politics.148 
In contrast to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Russian interference in the Brexit 
campaign came to light slowly and its extent remains more contested. A U.K. government report 
published more than three years after the referendum concluded that Russian interference in the 
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referendum was “unquantifiable.”149 However, the report also acknowledged that the U.K. 
government did not investigate whether Russia interfered in the referendum.150 Although that 
lack of investigation means the extent and specifics of interference are less clear than in the 
United States, Luke Harding, a Guardian journalist with experience in Russia, argued that the 
U.K. government is “in denial” about interference.151 Additionally, studies by UC Berkeley and 
the University of Edinburgh found that social media accounts tied to Russian interference were 
active in posting about the Brexit referendum.152 However, retrospective academic research has 
been hindered by the deletion of data, such as when Twitter accounts involved in spreading 
disinformation during the referendum were deleted for spreading disinformation.153 Because of 
this paucity of research, there is considerably less debate and speculation about topics like 
Russia’s motives and impact on the Brexit referendum than in the U.S. case. 
While no comprehensive database of accounts and tweets from Russian actors in the 
Brexit referendum exists, examination of a list of 2752 IRA-linked accounts that spread 
disinformation and divisive content in the U.S. election allowed researchers from the University 
of Edinburgh to identify 419 accounts that also posted several thousand times about Brexit or 
Brexit-related topics such as the European Union and migration.154 While interference in the U.S. 
election took place through months of campaigning, Brexit interference through social media 
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was concentrated around the election day: just two weeks before the vote only about 1000 posts a 
day appeared from Russian actors related to the Brexit referendum.155 The day before and after 
the referendum, Russian Twitter accounts, many of which were bots, posted nearly 45,000 times 
about Brexit according to a report from UC Berkeley and Swansea University.156 One account 
called for the British to vote to “make June the 23rd our Independence Day.”157 According to 
89up, a communications company cited in the U.K. post-incident Parliamentary analysis, 
Russian bots created over 10 million potential impressions during the referendum campaign, 
nearly a third the reach of the official Leave.EU Twitter account.158 
In addition, Russian state news actively posted articles about the Brexit referendum. 
Sputnik and RT posted over 250 Brexit-related articles in 2016 prior to the referendum, which 
were typically pro-Leave.159 These articles created up to 134 million impressions, while the Vote 
Leave and Leave.EU websites combined had 44 million potential impressions.160  
 Although Russian interference in the U.K. Brexit campaign was on a smaller scale and 
lower profile than in the 2016 U.S. election, interference did occur. Russia used existing social 
media accounts, including bots, to comment on the Brexit referendum, and also successfully 
spread anti-EU stories through RT and Sputnik. As with the U.S. election, it is impossible to 
know how impactful Russian interference was on the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the EU; 
 
155 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Signs of Russian Meddling in Brexit Referendum,” The New York Times, November 15, 
2017, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/world/europe/russia-brexit-twitter-facebook.html.  
156 Reuters Staff, “Russian Twitter Accounts Promoted Brexit Ahead of EU Referendum: Times Newspaper,” 
Reuters, November 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-britain-eu-russia-idU.S.KBN1DF0ZR.  
157 Reuters Staff, “Russian Twitter Accounts Promoted Brexit Ahead of EU Referendum.”  
158 89up, “Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016…,” 
https://www.slideshare.net/89up/putins-brexit-the-influence-of-kremlin-media-bots-during-the-2016-uk-eu-
referendum; “Disinformation and ‘Fake News’: Final Report - Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee - House 
of Commons.” 
159 “Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum” (89up, February 
10, 2018), https://www.89up.org/russia-report.  
160 “Putin’s Brexit? The Influence of Kremlin Media & Bots during the 2016 UK EU Referendum.” 
 
 54 
however, as in the U.S., the EU referendum result had a narrow margin. Because of the narrow 
margin, any number of factors could have tipped the vote to either side.  
 
U.K. Response to Russian Interference in the Brexit Referendum 
 
According to a member of Parliament in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, “The 
outrage isn’t if there is interference; the outrage is no one wanted to know if there was 
interference.”161 As far back as 2016, the U.K. government’s response to allegations of Russian 
interference in the Brexit referendum campaign has been focused on denial and downplaying.162  
Public communication in the United Kingdom about Russian disinformation was 
inconsistent. In November 2017, U.K. Prime Minister Theresa May, who took over from David 
Cameron with a promise to facilitate Brexit, attacked Russia in a speech for election interference, 
saying that Putin was trying to “undermine free societies.”163 The BBC called her comments a 
“stark contrast to those of U.S. President Donald Trump” who at the time claimed that he 
believed President Putin’s denials that it interfered in the U.S. 2016 election.164 In response to her 
speech, a former Labour cabinet minister asked “why May [was] suddenly acknowledging 
Russian interference now having stonewalled for months.”165 The U.K. government demonstrated 
much greater hesitance to investigate or acknowledge allegations of Russian disinformation. 
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The U.K. government did eventually begin an investigation into Russian disinformation 
in the Brexit referendum. In late 2017, more than a year after the Brexit vote, the Digital, 
Culture, Media, and Sport Select Committee, a committee in the British House of Commons, 
began an investigation into disinformation online.166 Though the inquiry focused on 
disinformation in general, it included some research into Russian election interference, including 
during the Brexit referendum. Starting in late 2017, several months after the referendum, the 
inquiry requested information from Facebook about disinformation. Though Facebook did not 
share any data on Russian influence networks, it shared limited data about advertising and 
unrelated disinformation.167 The interim report issued by the select committee in July 2018 
contained research on foreign disinformation during the 2016 referendum, citing academic 
studies, and Leave.EU and Arron Banks’ potential ties to Russia.168 The National Crime Agency 
(NCA), the U.K.’s lead law enforcement agency against cybercrime, organized crime, and 
economic crime, investigated the allegations against Arron Banks and in September 2019 found 
that the money donated to Leave.EU came from his company and was not laundered for 
Russia.169 However, the NCA did not rule out investigating him for other overseas criminal 
business, implying that his overall wealth and ability to donate could rely on foreign 
opportunities and connections.170 The final report of the Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport Select 
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Committee, published February 2019, contained less detail, simply stating the government 
cannot say that there was “no evidence of successful interference” and recommended that the 
U.K. government publicize any inquiries into election interference and commission an 
independent inquiry.171 In January 2018, the U.K. government created a new national security 
unit dedicated to combating disinformation.172 The National Security Communications Unit was 
created in order to better deter opponents from election interference and disinformation.173 
In July 2020 the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament released the 
final public report on Russian interference in the United Kingdom overall.174 The ISC began 
investigating Russian interference in U.K. democracy in November 2017.175 Despite being 
completed over a year earlier, its publication was delayed by the U.K. government, supposedly 
due to normal procedural actions like redaction and the need to reconstitute the committee after 
the 2019 election.176 However, the committee’s previous chair called the reasons for the delay 
“entirely bogus,” and Prime Minister Boris Johnson was accused of delaying the report because 
of his party’s ties to Russian oligarchs.177 The report failed to ascertain whether Russia interfered 
in the EU referendum, emphasizing primarily the lack of U.K. investigation into potential 
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interference, rather than evaluation of the alleged interference itself.178 When asked for evidence 
about Russian interference in the Brexit referendum, MI5, the United Kingdom’s main domestic 
intelligence agency, responded with only six lines of text and a reference to public academic 
studies.179 The report nonetheless recommended that the U.K. intelligence community investigate 
and publish a report on Russian interference in the UK referendum; however, a public report has 
not yet been published as of May 2021.180  
Overall, the U.K. response to 2016 Russian election interference has been slower and 
even less thorough than the U.S. response, in addition to being similarly uncoordinated. It is 
notable that U.K. government agencies pointed to private academic research, instead of offering 
information based on their own research and intelligence, when asked about their knowledge of 
the extent of Russian interference in the Brexit referendum.181 Unlike in the United States, the 
U.K. response did not include any punitive actions such as prosecutions or sanctions. The United 
Kingdom appears to be several steps behind the United States in reacting to Russian actions, 
having stalled before completing investigations into the presence of interference in the Brexit 
referendum. The United States and United Kingdom faced similar challenges, each experiencing 
a contentious attack on its domestic political system. Why was the policy process in both states 
disorganized, and what different challenges did the United States and United Kingdom face?   
  
 
178 James, “UK Government Failed to Find out Whether Russia Meddled in Brexit Vote.”  
179 “Russia” (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, July 21, 2020), 12. 
180 James, “UK Government Failed to Find out Whether Russia Meddled in Brexit Vote.”  
181 “Russia” (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, July 21, 2020), 12 & 40. 
 
 58 
Chapter 3: Organizational Policy Decisions 
Which factors shaped the U.S. and U.K. responses to the 2016 Russian disinformation 
campaigns, resulting in similarly uncoordinated responses but more a limited one in the United 
Kingdom? How does a bureaucratic politics approach shed light on the case studies? The 
bureaucratic politics model can be applied to the U.S. and U.K. case studies to illuminate 
important factors affecting policy in response to Russian disinformation. I begin Chapter 3 by 
analyzing the U.S. case study. I first examine how the bureaucratic politics model can inform the 
impact of actors’ standard operating procedures on their choices in the U.S. case study. I then 
discuss how the U.S. case presents strong challenges to expectations of bargaining and 
leadership in the process of policy formulation, challenging the analytical utility of bureaucratic 
politics. Next, I discuss the importance of geopolitical context and how it affects and 
complements the above factors. Then, I discuss the role of the Presidency, assessing how its 
constraints and importance in creating leadership differ from those of other actors in the U.S. 
case. Finally, I discuss how the U.K. case reveals the significance of a government’s institutional 
structure, specifically the division or centralization of power, on bargaining and leadership in the 
decision-making process. The analysis demonstrates that bureaucratic politics can generate key 
insights, but that some of its predictions may be less robust without the domestic-consensus-
building, bipolar competition that shaped foreign policy during the Cold War.   
 
Bureaucratic Politics Applications to the U.S. Case Study 
 The bureaucratic politics model can be applied to the U.S. case study to help illuminate 
some aspects of government interaction, such as reliance on standard operating procedure by 
agencies and partisan division. The analytical leverage of standard operating procedure, 
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however, depends somewhat on taking into account context, particularly the presence or absence 
of a unifying threat. In addition, the U.S. case study poses challenges to the importance of 
bargaining and leadership as key factors in the policy process as predicted by a bureaucratic 
politics approach. 
 
Standard Operating Procedures 
Many of the U.S. actions taken in response to Russian election interference strongly 
conform to the idea in bureaucratic politics that actors have defined roles and histories, and their 
actions are selected from a set of standard operating procedures shaped by their areas of 
responsibility and experiences. Examples of expected actions that can be illuminated by this 
aspect of the approach include DoJ indictments, retaliatory hacking by the NSA and Cyber 
Command, intelligence agencies issuing investigative reports, internal investigations by 
Congressional oversight committees, and even to some degree partisan division by the President 
and other political actors. Using bureaucratic politics to examine these actions, which constitute 
a large portion of overall U.S. responses, reveals that the responses are not in fact as unusual or 
unexpected as some of them were perceived to be at the time.  
One of the primary options considered by the Obama Administration was economic 
sanctions. Although sanctions are a standard response to provocations that do not rise to the level 
of armed conflict, they ended up being one of the less significant aspects of the response in this 
case.182 Interestingly, sanctions were of limited use in the 2016 response precisely because most 
viable sanctions had already been imposed as a standard response to Russian actions like the 
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2014 invasion of Ukraine to the degree that “the remaining economic options would incur 
significant blowback to either the United States or its allies, notably the Europeans.”183 President 
Obama’s initial executive order, which was codified into law by the 2017 CAATSA, did 
implement some sanctions, though they were likely of low impact as they targeted figures in the 
Russian intelligence agencies who were unlikely to be affected by U.S. sanctions.184 
 DoJ indictments and hacking back by U.S. Cyber Command were probably the clearest 
examples of actors’ actions being derived from their standard operating procedures. The DoJ is 
empowered to prosecute cases for the U.S. government, as well as defend the country against 
foreign threats.185 The DoJ’s main tools are investigation, including special counsel investigations 
followed by prosecution if illegal actions are uncovered. Following a special counsel 
investigation, in February 2018, the DoJ issued indictments through a grand jury against 
Russians involved in the IRA for breaking U.S. laws against hacking and fraud, among other 
charges.186 The indictments fell exactly in line with the mission of the DoJ, as well as the FBI, 
which operates under the DoJ: DoJ is empowered to enforce laws and protect U.S. interests, 
including against foreign threats. In addition, the DoJ enforced the existing law around foreign 
agents (FARA) by compelling RT to register as a foreign agent.187  
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The U.S. Cyber Command was designed as the military command charged with leading 
or coordinating cyber operations in order to protect national security, and like DoJ, this 
institution hewed closely to the role defined in its mission statement in the aftermath of the 
misinformation campaigns.188 U.S. Cyber Command worked with the NSA to inform the FBI and 
DHS about election interference threats in the run up to the 2018 midterm elections.189 Cyber 
Command’s actions were designed to disrupt Russian interference in U.S. elections as a 
preventative before the 2018 midterms.190 Cooperation with other intelligence agencies to counter 
threats to U.S. cyber infrastructure is standard for Cyber Command; for example, more recently 
it cooperated with DHS on the response to the SolarWinds hack, which affected U.S. 
government infrastructure.191 
 Reports issued by the DNI and Congressional reports and investigations were also 
strongly aligned with the roles of those actors. Throughout the response process, numerous 
intelligence reports, including the 2016 JAR and 2017 ICA, were issued by different agencies, 
including DNI, DHS, FBI, CIA, and NSA. Congressional committees, in addition to drafting 
legislation, are tasked with oversight and investigation of government actions.192 This 
investigative and oversight role played a strong role in Congressional actions in response to 2016 
Russian election interference. Committees relevant to the process, including the Senate Select 
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Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, held 
hearings to investigate and interview government actors such as former FBI Director James 
Comey and issued reports that investigated election interference as well as the analytical 
processes used by intelligence agencies to make their earlier determinations about interference.193 
Not only did Congressional committees’ actions fall under their investigative mandates, but they 
also were driven by their roles of providing government oversight in analyzing the 2016 election 
and analytical procedures in the 2017 ICA. 
 Congressional actions also demonstrate the bureaucratic politics theory’s view that 
organizations’ roles and procedures restrict the actions of individual members. Congress is an 
organization comprised of partisan actors. While individual representatives are able to make 
political statements, the collective organization of Congress and its procedures constrained 
individual dissent. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Report published in 
2018 involved the most contentious conclusions, initially denying and then downplaying Russian 
preference for President Trump, as well as restricting investigations of collusion allegations.194 
Both Republican and Democratic actions were constrained by Congressional procedures. 
Democrats were unable to force Republicans to include more information critical of President 
Trump and were limited to publishing a supplement to the final report and issuing a statement in 
protest, as they were in the minority. Ranking Member Adam Schiff published a response, in 
addition to a supplementary Minority Views section added to the committee report, criticizing 
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the majority investigation.195 However, Schiff was not able to break free of the limitations of 
being part of the minority on the committee in order to change the report itself. On the other 
hand, Republicans were similarly constrained from completely refuting the claim that Russia 
supported President Trump, as they were unable to defend the claim and had to submit the report 
for review by both the minority and Intelligence Community before publishing.196  
However, one action seemingly contradicts the position that government actors behave in 
accordance with their legal and historically defined roles. After President Trump voiced support 
for Putin’s denials of election interference, President Trump’s own DNI, Dan Coats, took the 
unusual step of directly refuting Trump’s support for the Russian assertion of innocence.197 The 
DNI is a traditionally nonpartisan role.198 The position was created in 2004 to establish an 
independent director to oversee the Intelligence Community, which itself is traditionally seen as 
nonpartisan.199 In addition, the DNI is the primary intelligence advisor to the President and 
NSC.200 Although these aspects of the role would seem to result in a low-profile, nonpartisan 
actor predisposed to avoid conflict, DNI Coats made a public statement contradicting comments 
made by President Trump. 
Bureaucratic politics points to a potentially relevant context for DNI Coats’ statement. 
While individual incentives are strongest among political actors, institutional actors also have 
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goals beyond simply enacting standard operating procedure. All individual government actors, 
including institutional ones, are driven to increase and protect their areas of influence and 
authority.201 Possibly, in the face of deep Presidential animosity towards the Intelligence 
Community and its conclusions, DNI Coats was attempting to protect the authority and 
legitimacy of the DNI by distancing himself from the partisan statements made by Trump and 
supporting the Intelligence Community he led. 
 
Leadership 
Although actions taken largely comported with bureaucratic roles and precedence, the 
clear leadership role anticipated for one actor by a bureaucratic political approach did not 
materialize in the U.S. case.202 Leadership is important to the policy formation process, as it 
creates a space in which organizations can interact as a group and bargaining can occur. While a 
couple of specific examples of effective cooperation and leadership involving a few, related 
actors arose, the U.S. policy response process as a whole lacked a point person or organization. 
Though there was no overall leader, a few specific examples in the U.S. case study 
demonstrate the emergence of a point person. As the bureaucratic politics approach might 
anticipate, President Obama’s initial response to Russian election interference was formed 
through discussion with a small group of relevant individuals, including the DNI, CIA Director, 
and Attorney General.203 The group eventually expanded to include the Departments of Defense, 
State, and Treasury, as they were relevant to response options.204 This more deliberative type of 
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policy process, in which stakeholders come together to discuss all potential options, is more 
similar to the cases presented by Allison and Halperin because it involved the sort of group 
collaboration they discussed with respect to the Cuban Missile Crisis and ABM deployment. As 
part of the Obama administration response, the NSC encouraged the Intelligence Community 
under the leadership of the DNI to come to a unified conclusion on Russian disinformation.205 
While the ICA was not entirely unanimous and completion of the report took longer than the 
NSC hoped as the NSA had a different standard for assessing confidence levels, the report was 
mostly unified.206 In addition, the FBI had an interest in protecting its institutional reputation for 
being nonpartisan and worried that public statements by the FBI about election security during 
an election could be harmful to the institution, which was balanced by the NSC’s desire for to 
respond strongly to the DNC hack and treat it like any other security breach.207 Unlike the lack of 
cooperation after Trump’s inauguration, these signs of bargaining and actors’ distinct interests 
reflected a U.S. response under President Obama consistent with expectations of bureaucratic 
politics theory.  
Joint intelligence reports as well as joint cyber campaigns reflected cooperation and 
bargaining under the coordination of the DNI and Cyber Command whose missions most closely 
conforms with the challenge of leading the response. The 2017 ICA is an example of cooperation 
and compromise under the leadership of the DNI. The DNI coordinated the Intelligence 
Community’s assessments in order to publish the JAR. While there was slight variation among 
the analysis and focus of agencies’ conclusions, for example the NSA confidence level in 
Russian preference towards Trump being lower, the agencies were able to publish a single, 
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almost entirely unanimous report.208 In addition, while there are fewer details due to the covert 
nature of the actions, U.S. Cyber Command coordinated with the NSA to identify and deter 
Russian actors and to pass along information to the FBI and DHS.209  
Despite these few specific instances where one actor was in charge of the process, the 
overall government response, the majority of which took place under the Trump Administration, 
lacked leadership. Victoria Nuland, the former Assistant Secretary of State for European and 
Eurasian Affairs, in her testimony for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, specifically 
criticized the absence of a “whole-of-government approach” led by the President.210 In the 2016 
U.S. case, unlike Halperin’s ABM missile deployment example in which the President ultimately 
made a single choice after input from different government actors, there was no identifiable 
leading actor.211 This was not for lack of an existing mission-appropriate actor to whom to 
delegate responsibility. DHS, for example, could have been designated by the President to 
coordinate and lead all U.S. responses to election interference. DHS’s mission includes 
responding to cyber incidents, including specifically coordinating the U.S. response “to ensure 
greater unity of effort and a whole-of-nation response to cyber incidents,” so overall 
responsibility would have been consistent with the DHS mission.212 However, several agencies 
have relevant departments or missions including the FBI and U.S. Cyber Command, and so there 
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was no single, clear, pre-existing delegation of authority for the overall response. Outside of the 
one-time JAR issued in December 2016, no agency or actor took responsibility for coordinating 
and communicating policy options.  
 
Bargaining 
Bargaining appears to be another relatively rare component of the U.S. policy formation 
process, despite its prominence in bureaucratic politics. While bargaining does not always result 
in compromise, the U.S. policy response process under the Trump administration involved little 
collaborative or non-adversarial communication among government agencies, the President, and 
Congress. Leadership and bargaining tend to occur together because leadership helps organize a 
space in which bargaining can occur, which seems to be particularly important for large scale or 
multilateral bargaining. Instead of collaborating and bargaining, various government actors with 
different interests generally acted without consulting one another or coming to consensus. While 
bureaucratic politics helps in analyzing the actions taken by independent organizations in all but 
a few outlier cases, it is less helpful in the U.S. case for analyzing how organizations combined 
and interacted to form a broader policy because, by and large, individual actions did not combine 
to form a greater policy or strategy.  
Enactment of the 2017 CAATSA superficially seemed like a compromise between 
Congress and the Presidency. In reality, the 2017 CAATSA was passed by a large enough 
margin that Trump would likely have faced an embarrassing veto override if he had refused to 
sign, resulting both in failure to block the law and criticism from his own party.213 Regardless, 
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President Trump issued a statement along with the signing detailing legal objections to the bill 
that offered him the ability to affect how it was enforced, thereby eroding the impact of 
Congressional action.214 
While the actions of various government actors by necessity built on each other, under 
the Trump administration, there was no overall guiding strategy or policy consensus from the 
U.S. government. There was no documented meeting among Congressional leaders, President 
Trump, and agency officials to discuss potential options, even one with only some actors or one 
that did not lead to successful compromise. DoJ indictments, issued in February and July 2018 
by a grand jury after presentation of the case by DoJ, were brought following the Mueller special 
counsel investigation and 2017 ICA. Similarly, Congressional reports analyzed and confirmed 
the 2017 ICA because they were oversight investigations meant to confirm and inspect the 
process by which intelligence reports came about. However, these actions occurred sequentially 
and reactively rather than as a result of multilateral, real-time discussions or in pursuit of an 
overarching strategy.  
 
Context 
 The bureaucratic politics approach was developed during the Cold War, which provided 
an overarching context for U.S. foreign policy. The 2016 U.S. case suggests that some of the 
theory’s assumptions based on the stability and consensus of the Cold War need to be adjusted 
for the more fragmented priorities of modern foreign policy. The absence of context in 
bureaucratic politics theory has previously attracted criticism, as organizations’ level of 
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involvement, particularly the Presidency, can vary with the importance of an issue.215 During the 
Cold War, there was bipartisan agreement that the Soviet Union was the main competitor of the 
United States, with ideological conflict playing out around the world through proxy battles and 
events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and ABM deployment. Despite strains, by 2016 the 
U.S.-Russian relationship was warmer, involving some cooperation, than during the Cold War, 
and there was less consensus that Russia was an enemy of the United States. These contextual 
shifts impact the influence of standard operating procedure, leadership, and bargaining, 
broadening the parameters of debate over the U.S.-Russian relationship. 
 The Cold War was defined by several characteristics that influenced policymaking, 
though at the time these characteristics may have simply been viewed as the largely immutable 
default. Foreign policy consensus represents the most relevant of these characteristics to my 
analysis. During the Cold War, there was a strong political consensus that the Soviet Union was 
the United States’ primary competitor and enemy. 216 This consensus meant that politicians 
shared a common cause, even if they had slightly different desired policies, making leadership 
and collaboration easier. In contrast, by 2016 there was no longer consensus that Russia should 
be viewed as an enemy of the U.S., and China was seen by many as the primary threat. As a 
result, leadership, and therefore bargaining, are likely to occur less smoothly as actors may have 
opposing views of the fundamental situation as well as optimal policy responses. In addition, the 
Cold War international system was bipolar, with one major competitor to United States 
hegemony. In contrast, the current international system is more complex but includes some 
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multipolar characteristics.217 A multipolar system, or one with a less identifiable single 
competitor, creates more competing issue areas for Presidential attention and leadership, 
meaning that Russian election interference might be deprioritized in favor of other issues like 
technology competition with China or Iran nuclear negotiations. 
 The effects of context on the relevance of standard operating procedure are more 
nuanced. Standard operating procedures are relatively stable, an important assumption of 
bureaucratic politics. Organizations accumulate experience and responsibilities, allowing them to 
form standard operating procedures that evolve slowly over time in response to new challenges. 
While bureaucratic politics explains that organizations will look to standard operating procedures 
to formulate responses, it does not examine the constraints placed on the selection of standard 
operating procedures by context. During the Cold War, while the United States made no overt 
direct response to Soviet disinformation campaigns, it ran parallel covert disinformation 
campaigns against Soviet-aligned politicians and groups in other countries.218 The consensus that 
the Soviet Union was an enemy of the United States, as well as the increased urgency created by 
the ideological aspect of the conflict and existential threat of nuclear weapons, enabled 
government organizations to agree on more aggressive retaliation.219 Because the conflict 
between the United States and Russia today is less ideologically driven and existential, actors 
may not consider some standard operating procedures for lower level threats because of the 
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The Complex Presidency 
While Presidential actions are shaped by the traditional Presidential role, such as reliance 
on executive branch agencies, conformity with party platforms, and wary treatment of 
adversarial states, political institutions constrain individual imperatives less. Even the actions of 
President Trump, who was strongly criticized for speaking against the investigations rejecting 
allegations that Russia supported him and downplaying all election interference allegations, can 
be illuminated by the theory that roles limit and influence actions. Analyzing the role of the 
Presidency in the U.S. response to the Russian misinformation effort presents challenges due to 
the strongly divergent analyses of President Trump’s response. Many of Trump’s actions shortly 
after the election directly contradicting statements and actions taken by his predecessor, 
President Obama, Congress, and executive agencies, were seen as aberrant, breaking ranks with 
the stance of other major federal government actors, and were strongly criticized, including from 
within his own party.220 In particular, President Trump’s denial that Russia interfered in the 
election, rejection of conclusions made by traditionally apolitical intelligence agencies, and 
attempts to create a less adversarial relationship with Russia were directly refuted by the 
Republican Speaker of the House Paul Ryan.221 Shortly after Trump’s election in 2016, one 
intelligence official said that the administration’s hostility to intelligence agencies put it in 
“uncharted territory.”222  
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Despite the backlash against Trump’s actions, they can be explained by how those 
choices were shaped by standard operating procedure as informed by bureaucratic politics 
theory. While stable, more nonpartisan organizations like the State Department are strongly 
constrained by standard operating procedure, the Presidency is less constrained. The Presidency 
is an elected role, and as a result, the President has both a partisan affiliation as well as individual 
incentives such as achieving reelection. However, President Trump’s pre-Presidency positivity 
towards Russia was not affected by the reelection imperative in his denial of Russian election 
interference, as his friendliness predated his election. 
 In contrast to unelected, less partisan agencies, which are primarily driven by their roles 
and past experience and subject to much weaker political and personal influence, in the case of 
the Presidency the influence of the institutional mission of the Presidency and convention 
compete with strong individual motivations. For example, President Trump’s actions were 
influenced by the need to court public opinion and achieve reelection, while the CIA had no such 
direct imperative. Trump’s campaign promises included reevaluating the U.S.-Russian 
relationship including through increased cooperation against Islamic State, which meant that as 
President he was incentivized to follow through with a friendlier and more collaborative posture 
towards Russia, a stance challenged by the election interference allegations. In line with this 
position, President Trump consistently downplayed or denied Russian interference in the 2016 
election and opposed efforts to respond to it.  
Allegations of Russian election interference, particularly the allegation that Russia had 
favored him and attempted to encourage his election, also called into direct question President 
Trump’s democratic legitimacy. This incentivized President Trump’s denials that Russia 
interfered, particularly that Russia supported him, in order to protect his democratic legitimacy. 
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He referred to allegations that Russia favored him as “just another excuse” that Hillary Clinton 
lost and argued that “they have no idea if it’s Russia or China or somebody.”223 President Trump 
is often seen as unique or an outlying case in his breaking of Presidential norms, but in fact, the 
outlying element here is unusually high-profile foreign interference in a domestic election, which 
connects Trump’s choices to his Presidential legitimacy and individual drive to be reelected. 
While other foreign policy decisions can affect reelection prospects to the extent that voters favor 
one policy or another, election interference is uniquely entangled with reelection itself and, as a 
result, has an unusually direct effect on those actors who are the subject of the election in 
question.224 Supporting efforts to retaliate against Russia would have been tacit acceptance that 
his election was tainted by foreign influence. By opposing sanctions and retaliation, Trump 
further attempted to discredit the existence of Russian election interference in the eyes of his 
supporters and shore up his legitimacy. President Trump’s decision to break with the position of 
leaders in the Republican Party was likely driven in part by his newcomer status to politics and 
the potential that his supporters were anti-establishment and more connected to him than the 
party.225 This perceived disconnect of his base of support from the Republican Party reduced the 
conventional incentive for a President to cooperate with their party. Though President Trump’s 
denial of Russian election interference disrupted leadership and bargaining in the wider U.S. 
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response, Trump’s actions are unsurprising in the context of his individual interests and within 
the constraints and incentives of his role as President. 
 
Insights from the U.K. Case Study 
 The bureaucratic politics model was developed in response to several case studies of U.S. 
policymaking and therefore tends to make certain assumptions based on the U.S. government 
structure. The approach’s roots in the U.S. case are particularly notable in bureaucratic politics’ 
focus on separation of powers, such as Allison’s discussion of the Presidential power to persuade 
under the governmental politics model.226 However, the primary assumption of bureaucratic 
politics, that governments are made of multiple, interconnected organizations who have defined 
roles and respond based on standard operating procedures, applies to all governments, as does 
the assumption that sub-state systems rely on bargaining between multiple actors to create state-
level outcomes. The U.K. case challenges a bureaucratic politics framework, as the response was 
largely dictated by Boris Johnson, the Prime Minister, instead of an actor with more experience 
or a mission more directly connected to election interference, such as one of the U.K. 
intelligence agencies. In addition, the U.K. intelligence agencies publicly distanced themselves 
from the response to Russia’s Brexit election interference, despite the assertion by the U.K. 
parliamentary investigation that defending the democratic process from foreign influence 
“should fall to [the] intelligence and security Agencies.”227 
While the responses of the United States and United Kingdom seem similar on the 
surface, characterized by conflict within each government and relatively uncoordinated and 
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limited overt actions, important differences between the cases exist. The U.K. response, unlike 
that in the United States, superficially seems to have involved leadership and coordination by 
one actor, which is what bureaucratic politics would anticipate when an issue falls under the 
responsibility of several actors. However, despite superficial conformity with the bureaucratic 
politics model, on closer examination, the U.K. case diverges even more from predictions of the 
theory than the U.S. case. In the United Kingdom, despite the seeming relevance of the 
intelligence agencies, MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, to the issue of election interference, policy was 
ultimately controlled by PM Boris Johnson. Unlike the U.S. case, standard operating procedure 
had relatively limited impact. In addition, leadership and bargaining appear to be disconnected in 
the U.K. case. By contrast, in the United States, the Obama and Trump Administrations’ process 
and outcomes appear to demonstrate leadership and bargaining going hand-in-hand, with the 
Trump Administration demonstrating the absence of both. 
 
Concentration of Power in the United Kingdom 
 The U.K.’s parliamentary democracy system of government, which concentrates more 
authority in one organization, creates a different environment for organizational interaction than 
the separation of powers of the U.S. Presidential democracy. Presidential systems, including that 
of the United States, revolve around the separation between the executive and legislative 
branches, devolving decision-making powers to different actors and lacking a singular decision 
maker. Unlike the U.S. government, in which the President, Congress, and even agencies to 
some degree have the authority to take independent action within a system of checks and 
balances, legislative systems like the United Kingdom’s combine the executive and legislative 
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roles in a unified hierarchy, with the head of the legislature serving as Prime Minister.228  While 
the United States and United Kingdom both have bicameral legislative systems, in the United 
Kingdom power rests with the Prime Minister, who is chosen by the majority party or coalition 
in the House of Commons and is ultimately responsible for all policy decisions.229 Because the 
executive and legislative roles are combined, they are never occupied by opposing parties. In 
addition, power is more centralized because the executive leads the legislature, reducing the 
number of independent actors and their ability to influence policy. In contrast, in the United 
States the President is separate from Congress and regularly comes from the opposite party from 
the Congressional majority, and thus often lacks legislative support to create policy.  
 The Prime Minister leads and appoints members of the Cabinet, which includes heads of 
important departments and have similar functions to executive agencies in the United States.230 
While the Prime Minister needs to retain the confidence of the House of Commons, a majority 
vote of no confidence forces the majority party to elect a new Prime Minister and form a new 
government, risking a loss of power, thus preventing votes of no confidence being used as 
routine leverage against the Prime Minister.231  
The centralization of power, combined with a fairly stable hold on that power, disrupts 
the connection between leadership and bargaining in the U.K. case. Despite the emergence of 
policy leadership, the process in the United Kingdom did not lead to collaboration and 
bargaining among different actors in the government. The bureaucratic politics model seems 
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specifically tailored towards the type of bargaining interaction that occurs in a system like the 
United States in which there is separation of powers, and indeed it was designed with the 
Presidential system of the United States in mind. While bargaining can occur in other systems, 
there is more of an imperative within the U.S. system for the primary actor, such as the President 
in Halperin’s analysis of ABM missile deployment, to take into account and incorporate the 
preferences of other actors in decisions.232 Operating in a system with separation of powers, the 
U.S. President often relies on others, typically Congress as it can pass legislation for major 
changes, to implement promised policies. This leads to an incentive for more bargaining, as well 
as the potential for organizations with greater independence. When Johnson was deciding 
whether and when to release the report on the U.K. response to 2016 Russian disinformation, he 
did not have the same type of incentives to bargain or compromise with other actors, who were 
ultimately responsible to him through the U.K.’s unified power structure. Despite protests from 
the former parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee chair as well as opposition 
politicians that the report should be published before the election, Johnson delayed the report 
until several months after the 2019 general election.233 The report was allegedly delayed as it 
contained potentially embarrassing evidence that Russia attempted to influence senior figures in 
the Conservative Party.234 A unitary system like that in the United Kingdom leaves more space 
for individual interests to dominate organizational politics.  Thus, the U.K. parliamentary system 
appears more consistent with generation of leadership than the U.S. due to unification of power, 
even as it challenges the idea that leadership and bargaining go hand in hand. 
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Interestingly, intelligence agencies played a small part in the U.K. response, even though 
their designated areas of responsibility, which traditionally include counterintelligence, would 
logically dictate that they would be involved with or even coordinate the response. The extreme 
caution of U.K. intelligence agencies about being involved in the response to election 
interference has been attributed to a reluctance to appear to interfere with U.K. democracy.235 In 
the United States, the initial response process of the Obama administration also demonstrated 
some of this hesitancy around democracy and perceptions; however, the U.S. government took 
action even before the November 2016 election.236 It is unclear why U.K. intelligence agencies 
were so reluctant to play a role in the U.K. response while U.S. actors overcame their hesitancy 
around perceptions. Possibly the U.K. intelligence agencies were choosing not to act in order to 
protect their institutions and institutional reputations for avoiding politics, analogous to the case 
of DNI Coats in the United States. The governing Conservative Party had an incentive, like that 
of Trump, not to emphasize Russian interference because of fears of undermining the legitimacy 
of the Tory government. However, U.S. intelligence agencies independently investigated the 
Russian disinformation campaign in line with their mandates, despite President Trump’s 
opposition, while the U.K agencies did not.  In the more centralized U.K. system, greater control 
over the whole government by the executive may have dissuaded intelligence agencies from 
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becoming involved and potentially increased intelligence agencies’ instincts to protect their 
organizations. It nonetheless remains strange and inconsistent with the expectations of 
bureaucratic politics theory that U.K. agencies did not perform even a small-scale public 
investigation or, if they privately investigated, reveal evidence of Russian interference. 
 
Conclusion 
 What challenges do Russian election interference and disinformation, specifically in the 
U.S. and U.K. in 2016 elections, pose for bureaucratic politics theory? Can bureaucratic politics 
theory shed light on the allegedly partisan and ineffective policy formation processes in response 
to that interference? Why did the U.S. and U.K. responses differ in scale? Bureaucratic politics 
theory provides a useful, but limited, lens to analyze these cases and attempts to answer these 
questions, deepening the analysis beyond the public narrative of partisanship by focusing on the 
institutions over individuals. However, bureaucratic politics theory also has limitations in these 
cases. Bureaucratic politics seems strongest when applied to relatively stable issues, such as 
potentially the long U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, that are more closely analogous to the 
Cold War cases for which the theory was developed and faces greater challenges when applied to 
rapidly evolving and fragmentary issues like the use of social media disinformation to attack 
elections.   
In the U.S. case, bureaucratic politics reveals the relevance of actors’ roles and standard 
operating procedures in guiding and constraining their choices and seemed to predict responses 
relatively effectively. Many U.S. actions were based on standard operating procedure, such as 
the DNI reports and DoJ special counsel investigations resulting in indictments. However, the 
U.S. case challenges the narrative that leadership and bargaining play a significant role in the 
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policy process, particularly with respect to the Trump administration’s response. President 
Trump was specifically criticized for the absence of a “Presidentially led, whole-of-government 
effort” necessary to protect U.S. democracy.237 While there were limited or shorter-duration 
examples of leadership and bargaining, such as the Obama administration’s reliance on the NSC 
for decision making, the overall U.S. response was defined by a lack of compromise and 
cooperation. All of the factors proposed by bureaucratic politics theory were influenced by 
changes in the geopolitical context since the theory was proposed during the Cold War. With the 
ideological struggle and urgency of the Cold War gone and lack of broad foreign policy 
consensus that Russia is an enemy of the United States, the pressure for leadership and 
bargaining has been greatly reduced and standard operating procedure is more constrained. In the 
future, the U.S. government could potentially improve responses to disinformation by expressly 
delegating responsibility for disinformation policy to non-elected, less partisan organizations; 
however, the challenge remains that the President could likely reclaim effective control if 
motivated to do so. 
 The U.K. case reveals even deeper challenges to bureaucratic politics theory, perhaps in 
part because the bureaucratic politics model was initially developed with the U.S. Presidential 
system in mind. While Prime Minister Johnson took leadership for the response consistent with 
the single leader hypothesis, he was a self-interested leader on election interference and used his 
position to obstruct other actors with relevant missions, such as U.K. intelligence agencies, 
instead of collaborating with them. The U.K. government’s response may have been limited in 
part because it has a larger number of veto points than the United States, preventing independent 
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action and allowing the Prime Minister to suppress opposing policies more effectively. In 
addition, the UK intelligence agencies, MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, took no public action to counter 
or investigate the Russian disinformation campaign despite the fact that it fell directly under their 
responsibilities and they counter other types of Russian interference in the United Kingdom, 
perhaps because of institutional preservation motives consistent with bureaucratic politics.238 The 
United Kingdom could potentially help reduce intelligence agencies’ hesitance to get involved in 
countering disinformation by making their responsibility to protect U.K. democracy, and 
elections specifically, explicit. 
  
Looking Ahead 
Ultimately, both the United States and United Kingdom struggled to form a coherent and 
collaborative policy process. A bureaucratic politics approach reveals the lack of leadership and 
coordination in the United States, as well as both the lack of compromise and effective 
fulfillment of responsibilities in the U.K. response. Despite substantially different governmental 
structures, the policy processes of both countries were challenged in responding to 
disinformation. Democracy and democratic institutions themselves may even be part of the 
challenge. As noted, election interference threatens the democratic legitimacy of leaders, creating 
an inherent incentive to suppress and ignore the issue instead of leading a rigorous, whole-
government policy response. While separation of powers in the United States enabled more 
actors to act independently, in many cases their diverging interests and goals led to oppositional 
behavior and a chaotic response, indicating that independent action is not likely to be as effective 
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as a well-led, coordinated, planned response. In the United Kingdom, unified power did allow for 
leadership to emerge, though not necessarily in the right place or with objectives that best 
protected national security, and correspondingly led other actors to abrogate their institutional 
responsibilities. Although the unified power structure of the parliamentary system appears more 
consistent with leadership generation, its greater veto potential challenges the linkage between 
leadership and bargaining. There is a paradox between struggles to establish leadership under 
one system and the disconnect between leadership and compromise in the other. 
The challenges highlighted by my analysis raise the question of how democracies can 
respond effectively to the threat of disinformation. Sharp power, including disinformation 
campaigns in democratic elections, is difficult to counter because it involves a closed society 
attacking an open one. The United States and other democracies are particularly vulnerable 
because they allow a free flow of information, media, and debate, while more authoritarian 
countries like Russia have tighter control over information and may feel less constrained by 
international norms. Therefore, while Russian state media like RT and Sputnik, in addition to 
groups like the IRA, operate in a variety of Western countries, the United States is unable to 
retaliate openly in kind against Russia for a variety of reasons. These include a potential 
weakening of international norms against domestic interference and strengthening Russia’s 
narrative that the United States interferes in Russia and near abroad states. Russia’s contrasting 
willingness to challenge international norms allows it to interfere in democracies with only a thin 
veneer of deniability. However, democracies may paradoxically rely on covert actions, like non-
public ultimatums or retaliatory hacking, that allow them to maintain a public moral high ground 
while take retaliatory or defensive actions, even as they are perceived as weak or ineffective. 
Disinformation thus seems to invite less democratic solutions, potentially reducing the control of 
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democratically elected officials over agencies, and more oversight of the flow of information to 
cut off foreign disinformation, potentially undermining democratic values of free speech and 
privacy. Democracies must balance the need to defend democracy from illiberal actors like 
Russia while minimizing reductions in democratic openness in the process.   
 Deterrence offers an appealing way for democracies to counter disinformation, focusing 
on the source of disinformation rather than worrying about democratic vulnerability. 
Democracies could increase the cost of foreign disinformation campaigns, altering the cost-
benefit calculations for such campaigns, by clearly enumerating retaliatory measures for 
disinformation campaigns and following through on them in the event of an attack. However, 
deterrence also shines light on some of the challenges of a response focusing on Russia and 
Russian motivations. Because disinformation is a non-military attack, policy response options 
are realistically constrained by the risk of escalation. Democratic governments have a limited set 
of standard tools they can use to respond to non-military conflict, relying heavily on sanctions 
and public condemnation. Sanctions, and potentially public condemnation, become less effective 
or limited by overuse, so different policy objectives may be competing for the same tools, 
making them less available or effective as a deterrent against disinformation. As noted, this 
frequent use appeared to have limited the utility of sanctions against Russian 2016 election 
interference. Tools like indictment are unlikely to provide a strong deterrent effect in foreign 
policy, as targets typically live abroad. Such measures also often provoke a tit-for-tat response 
that must be considered. These challenges are heightened by the special complications associated 
with cyber deterrence. In addition, the divisive effects of disinformation on domestic politics 
make it challenging to muster a whole-government collaboration, as seen in both the U.S. and 
U.K. cases. Partisanship is particularly problematic for deterrence, as clear messaging is 
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important, and mixed messages from different government actors disrupt the credibility of 
deterrence. 
 Ultimately, both bureaucratic politics theory and deterrence are limited by their focus 
solely on interactions within government, failing to account for key non-governmental actors like 
social media companies. While the U.S. and U.K. government policy processes were challenged 
in responding to a technologically advanced, domestic political attack, independent government 
action was not the only option for countering Russian disinformation. Private sector and 
coordinated public-private sector efforts have the potential to represent essential means of 
addressing the issue going forward. While the growth of social media allowed disinformation to 
become much more effective, collaboration with social media companies also provides a new 
avenue for addressing disinformation. In 2017, the Senate and House Intelligence Committees 
held hearings with representatives from major social media companies to discuss Russian 
disinformation in 2016, allowing Congress to pressure companies including Facebook and 
Twitter to address Russian disinformation, as well as domestic and other foreign disinformation, 
more effectively.239 Around the time of the hearings, several companies pledged to verify 
political advertisement purchasers and provide additional transparency around political activity 
on their platforms.240 While the federal government is able to address disinformation at its source 
by engaging with Russia directly, social media companies are able to address the disinformation 
and distribution itself by suppressing or removing disinformation networks and actors, and 
potentially reworking algorithms to deprioritize contentious topics or siloed communities. Their 
collaboration may be especially helpful given the rapidly evolving nature of the technology used 
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to promote disinformation and the relatively slower pace of bureaucratic action. Ultimately, 
disinformation can be most effectively addressed wholistically as not just as foreign policy, but 





 My analysis and background include major actions by federal government actors, such as 
bills, investigations, official statements, and executive orders. In addition, I include some 
comments in my analysis where they add important context to actions, such as President 
Trump’s discussion of and signing of the CAATSA bill. Most bills are initiated and formed by 
Congress, and signing by the President is secondary, so the policy is attributed to Congress. In 
the U.S. case, I use a cutoff of the 2018 midterms as any policies after the midterms cannot 
clearly be identified as a response to 2016.  I chose to exclude from my analysis informal 
remarks, routine activities such as Presidential signing of bills, and policy implemented after the 
2018 midterms. I exclude informal remarks because, due to the contentious and highly 
publicized nature of Russian disinformation in the U.S. election, there are a very large number of 
remarks.  
 In order to compile my timeline of events for the disinformation campaigns, I relied on 
news, think tank, and social media analysis reports, as well as to a lesser degree government 
post-incident reports. Four years later, the basic facts of the U.S. case study are fairly well 
established; the UK case study has been researched less, and therefore has less data available. As 
a result, I relied more on information that the U.K. government collected several years after the 
Brexit referendum. In both cases, the timeline of government policies was assembled by 
combining news reports and think tank lists of policy actions, and searching for relevant policy 
actions on the websites of important actors, including the U.S. President, U.K. Prime Minister, 
and Congressional intelligence committees. 
 There are a large number of relevant terms and phrases that can be used to refer to 
Russian actions during the 2016 U.S. election. I primarily use the terms election interference, 
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disinformation, and disinformation campaign because they are relatively specific and accurate to 
the cases. Other relevant terms include sharp power, foreign malign influence, information 
warfare, and foreign election interference. Less formal terms include fake news and propaganda. 
Misinformation, though occasionally used, is an inaccurate description of Russian actions in 
2016 because the concept of misinformation lacks intentionality, while disinformation involves 
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